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Dáil Éireann - Volume 38 - 04 June, 1931

Public Business. - Town Tenants Bill, 1930—Committee Stage.

The Dáil went into Committee.

Section 1 agreed to.

SECTION 2.

2.—In this Act—

the word “tenement” means land or premises complying with all the following conditions, that is to say:—

(a) it is situate in an urban area, and

(b) it consists either of land covered wholly or partly by buildings or of a defined portion of a building, and

(c) if it consists of land covered in part only by buildings, the portion of such land not so covered is subsidiary and ancillary to such buildings, and

[2388] (d) it is held by the occupier thereof under a lease or other contract of tenancy, and

(e) such contract of tenancy is not a letting made and expressed to be made for the temporary convenience of the lessor or of the lessee;

the expression “urban area” means an area which is either a county or other borough, an urban district, a town, or a village;

the word “tenant” means the person for the time being entitled to the occupation of a tenement and, where the context so admits, includes a person who has ceased to be entitled to such occupation by reason of the termination of his tenancy;

the word “landlord” means the person for the time being entitled to receive (otherwise than as agent for another person) the rent paid in respect of a tenement by the tenant thereof and, where the context so admits, includes a person who has ceased to be so entitled by reason of the termination of his tenancy;

the expression “superior landlord” means a person entitled in possession to a tenement by a tenure superior, whether mediately or immediately, to the tenure of the landlord of such tenement;

the expression “predecessors in title” when used in relation to a tenant means and includes all previous tenants of the tenement of such tenant under the same tenancy as such tenant or any tenancy of which such tenancy is or is deemed to be a continuation or renewal, and the said expression when used in relation to a landlord means and includes all previous landlords of the tenement of such landlord;

the word “lease” means an instrument in writing, whether under or not under seal, containing a contract of tenancy in respect of any land in consideration of a rent or return;

the word “lessee” shall, where the context so admits, be construed as including the executors, administrators, and assigns of the lessee;

the word “lessor” shall, where the context so admits, be construed as [2389] including the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of the lessor;

the word “improvement” when used in relation to a tenement means any addition or alteration to the buildings comprised in such tenement and includes any structure erected on such tenement which is ancillary or subsidiary to the said buildings but does not include work consisting only of repairing, painting, and decorating, or any of them;

the word “business” means any trade, profession, or business carried on for gain or reward;

the expression “compensation under this Act” shall be construed as equivalent to the expression “compensation for improvements and compensation for disturbance or either of them”;

the expression “relief under this Act” shall be construed as equivalent to the expression “compensation for improvements or a new tenancy under Part III of this Act”;

the word “prescribed” means prescribed by regulations made by the Minister for Justice under this Act; except in Part V of this Act, the expression “building lease” means a lease made partly in consideration of the lessee having erected or agreed to erect permanent buildings, whether new or additional, on the demised premises.

An Ceann Comhairle: Amendment 1, “In page 3 to delete line 24”, is outside the scope of the Bill.

Mr. Lemass: Is the Ceann Comhairle prepared to listen to an argument on that point?

An Ceann Comhairle: Yes.

Mr. Lemass: It seems to me that if the term “urban areas” which is used in the Title of the Bill is to be given its ordinary meaning it is in conflict with the definition which appears in Section 2, which includes a village. There is no definition of what constitutes a village in this Bill or in any Act. I do not know whether it is not even possible that the actual definition used in the Bill may meet the purpose intended [2390] to be served by the amendment. That is not likely, I agree, but in view of the vagueness of the meaning of the term village it is possible. The purpose of the amendment is to bring within the scope of the Bill all premises that can be described as urban premises, that is, shops and residences which are distinct from agricultural dwellings or anything of that kind. I take it that there can be no reason for including in the Bill a house that is one of a group of ten in any part of the country, and excluding a similar house that happens to be situate a quarter of a mile from them.

An Ceann Comhairle: That is rather on the merits than on whether the amendment is in order. The amendment, I take it, intends to make the Bill apply to tenancies whether situate inside or outside an urban area.

Mr. T.J. O'Connell: The Bill does that at present. Outside the ordinary definition of an urban area we have the word “village.” That is the difficulty Deputy Lemass and all of us are up against. No one can say what a village is. As far as I know and as far as the Minister for Justice knows everyone lives in a village in Mayo.

An Ceann Comhairle: But that seems to be no solution of the point of order. The Bill as drafted applies to tenancies in urban areas. The amendment proposes to delete the words “urban area” from the definition section, and that would make the Bill apply to all tenancies. The purport of the amendment, therefore, is to widen the scope of the Bill.

Mr. Lemass: I submit that the principle of the Bill may not be defined in the Title. The principle, I take it, is to regulate the relations between landlord and tenant concerning any holding which is not an agricultural holding, in which case the amendment would appear to be within the scope of the Bill.

An Ceann Comhairle: It is a matter of opinion. The Bill appears to me to cover tenancies in urban areas only. If you take out urban areas it extends the scope of the Bill.

[2391] Mr. Lemass: What are urban areas?

Mr. O'Connell: The point can be met if we can get a definition of what is meant by the expression “urban areas.”

An Ceann Comhairle: We do not define urban areas by proceeding to delete the words “urban area.” There may be something to be argued but not to a point of order.

Mr. Little: Does it not turn on the definition of the word “village”?

An Ceann Comhairle: No.

Mr. Little: Because subsequently we have an urban area defined as “An area which is either a county or other borough, an urban district, a town, or a village.” The trouble is one house might constitute a village.

An Ceann Comhairle: I am only dealing with the point of order. The Deputy may raise a question on the section. I am not concerned with the definition of a village. Nor am I concerned about what is an urban area. If this particular paragraph (a) be deleted the scope of the Bill would be extended.

Mr. Lemass: If the words “or a village” were not contained in the Bill in line 36 would it be possible to introduce them by way of amendment?

An Ceann Comhairle: That is a hypothetical question that I have not considered.

Mr. Lemass: It seems to me to be the kernel of the question.

An Ceann Comhairle: The amendment is not in order.

Mr. O'Connell: I think the point would be met by leaving in “urban areas” and then trying to define “urban areas.”

An Ceann Comhairle: The Ceann Comhairle is not in a position to define what the terms mean in any sense. Let us look at the Bill and see whether the amendment comes within its scope.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I move:—

[2392] In page 3, line 31, to delete the word “or” and substitute the word “of,” and after the word “tenancy” to insert the words “express or implied or arising by virtue of a statute.”

The reason for the amendment is that in the country now there are a considerable number of premises which are being held as statutory tenancies under the provisions of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Act. They are not held under contract of tenancy but under a quasi tenancy arising out of the provisions of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Act. It would, in a way, be more correct to deal with that class of house when that Act expires. It might be a more scientific way of dealing with the question if the status of tenants and their rights should be determined on the expiration of that Act. But a considerable amount of disquietude seems to have arisen amongst persons who are holding on under the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Act that they might not come in under the provisions of this Bill. It is quite possible also that persons who would be entitled to come under the Bill might be ousted from their rights before the expiration of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Act. Some landlords might be able to recover premises under that Act before the complete code expires. Though not possibly the most scientific way of dealing with the matter, I think that the most practical way of dealing with it is to decide whether tenants holding under the Act should or should not come under this Bill. I submit that they ought to come under it. On the expiration of the Act there would have been general opinion that they ought to come under it. The tenancies have not been determined, and I ask the House to agree to the amendment which will include them.

Mr. Lemass: This amendment, I think, seeks to serve the same purpose which I have in mind in amendment 4.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: Precisely.

Mr. Lemass: There was what we considered a serious defect in the Bill, and [2393] this will remedy it. The Minister denied on Second Reading that there was any such defect, and I am glad that he has since seen the light.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I beg your pardon. I stated clearly that it did not apply to tenancies unless there was a contract of tenancy.

Mr. Lemass: Well, the Official Report is there. The Minister has used the phrase “statutory tenancy.” I understand that that is only a colloquial phrase and has no significance, that the tenant is really not a tenant and has simply a statutory right of occupation. In view of that, is the wording in the best form?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: Yes, I think so. “Statutory tenancy” is used in the marginal note.

Mr. Lemass: It is clear that the question could not arise in future?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: No, it could not. The phrase is “or arising by virtue of a statute.”

Amendment put and agreed to.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I move:

In page 3, line 34, after the word “lessee” to add the words “and (if made after the passing of this Act) stating the nature of such temporary convenience.”

This amendment deals with the definition of “temporary convenience.” There is another amendment standing in Deputy O'Connell's name which deals with the same question. It was represented to me that in parts of the country a habit had grown up of putting into ordinary conveyances, ordinary leases, between landlords and tenants the words “for temporary convenience,” whether it was made for temporary convenience or not, while if these matters were litigated in court the documents would not hold water, and several of them were, in fact, set aside. At the same time, it led, or might lead, to a considerable amount of litigation. The best way, it seems to me, of getting over that matter is that not only should it appear in the written contract of tenancy that the letting is for temporary convenience, [2394] but that the actual nature of the letting for temporary convenience should be set out. It must be stated, if it is a temporary convenience on the part of the landlord, what that convenience is, and if it is a temporary convenience on the part of the tenant, it will also have to be stated what the temporary convenience is. In that way, words coming in when they should not be in, as a method of cheating the Act, will be done away with. Deputy O'Connell has an amendment which we might discuss on this—that is, amendment 3. I cannot accept it, but possibly it would be better if he gave his reasons for putting down that amendment now.

Mr. O'Connell: My amendment reads as follows:—

Before line 37, page 3, to insert the words “the expression `temporary convenience' when used in relation to a contract of tenancy shall be construed as excluding any lettings for a longer period than, in the case of business premises, one year or, in the case of dwelling houses, than three years.

Am I to take it that the Minister is trying to meet the point of my amendment by his own?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: No.

Mr. O'Connell: The Minister's amendment applies only to contracts made after the passing of the Act. I have in mind the cases that the Minister refers to and which seem to be particularly numerous in the constituency which both the Minister and I represent. Where this clause was put in it was put in quite clearly to defeat the purposes of the 1906 Act. I understand that there is a provision there that if the letting is for temporary convenience the tenant is not entitled to compensation. It was a habit of some landlords to put in a phrase of that kind, and it was only after considerable time that the tenants became alive to the fact that, as the Minister says, the courts would rule against it and would not allow a clause like that to be used in that way. The position is that in many tenancies, some of them existing for twelve or fifteen years, there is a clause of that kind there. I do not [2395] care how it is done, but my purpose is to see that a clause of that kind in an agreement will not defeat the purposes of the Act and will not prevent a tenant from getting the benefit of the provisions of this Bill. Perhaps it would be better to suggest what a temporary agreement is, but what about the old agreements where they are for twelve or fifteen years and where this clause exists? That is where there is a statement in the agreement that it is for the purpose of temporary convenience, although it is well known that it is not for temporary convenience. What would the position of a tenant be in that case?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: The position of a tenant would be this. He would make an application and the court would decide as to whether it was bona fide for temporary convenience or not. It would be impossible to say that a claim for improvements should be allowed because certain words were not in the conveyance which was executed before the passing of the Act. Supposing there is a bona fide case of a letting for temporary convenience entered into before the passing of the Act and it did not set out the nature of the temporary convenience because it was not required, it would be unfair to bring that within the meaning of the Act. You can only deal with the future, and I do not see how you can deal with past cases, except by allowing the court to decide as to whether or not they were bona fide. As the Deputy stated, some of these agreements in court were not held to be bona fide and were not binding on the tenant. This is to make it clear that these shall not be used as a common form in future, but the Deputy's amendment provides that a period of one year, or, in the case of a dwelling house, that three years should be the limit for which a letting for temporary convenience should last.

I am afraid you cannot put any figure on it except a figure for a lengthy period, because a letting for temporary convenience might very well be for a longer period than one year. For instance, let us suppose that there is an administration suit going on and that [2396] the court wishes to make a letting. The court will make a letting to somebody until the litigation is would up. That might be a much longer period than three years. Again, I can imagine somebody inheriting property when he is seventeen or eighteen years of age. His guardian would make a letting of his premises perhaps until he became twenty-one and until he would be able to manage his own business. It would be clear that he inherited the business, but under Deputy O'Connell's amendment he would be cut out. Again, a tenant might be in a position to take a new house or he might be inheriting a house in three or four years' time. He would go to a landlord and say: “Will you let me a house until I get possession of my own house?” That may be in three or four years' time, and the landlord might say “Yes.” The tenant in that case would get all the rights of the Bill although the landlord, if he thought he would, would never make the letting. Bona fide temporary convenience cases are very few indeed, but I think it would be impossible to limit the time because temporary convenience may last for a considerable number of years.

Mr. Lemass: The Minister's amendment seems to meet the need undoubtedly, but I am very definitely under the impression that the wording of it is defective in some way. It is proposed to add at the end of the paragraph (e) the words stated in the amendment, but does not the negative in the first sentence of the paragraph govern the amendment, so that the paragraph, as amended, would read, leaving out the unimportant part of it: “Such contract of tenancy is not a letting made for temporary convenience and stated to be made for temporary convenience”?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: Oh, no. I do not think the Deputy has read it correctly: It reads: “Such contract of tenancy is not a letting made and expressed to be made for the temporary convenience of the lessor or of the lessee and stating the nature of such temporary convenience.” It must be for the temporary convenience of the [2397] lessor or the lessee and, as well as that, it must state the nature of the temporary convenience.

Mr. Lemass: Yes. I agree with the Minister that Deputy O'Connell's amendment, although designed to deal with the situation that requires to be dealt with, does not appear to do so effectively. It would be very difficult to get an amendment which would limit a contract in time without risking the possibility of inflicting hardship upon individuals. The question arises, however, whether or not it is not desirable and possible to make the Minister's amendment retrospective in some way. There is a section in the Bill, Section 37, which deals with restrictions on contracting out. It provides that a contract, whether made before or after the passing of the Act, which would directly or indirectly deprive a tenant of his rights under the Act, is considered to be void. Would it not be possible to use that section?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: That is the existing law. Even under the old Town Tenants Act that is the existing law. If it is stated that the letting was for temporary convenience, and the court is satisfied that it was not for temporary convenience, then it is declared to be void. What Deputy O'Connell wishes is that a tenant would not be put to the trouble of going into court. I do not think there is a terrible amount in it, because a tenant will go into court unless it is a question of a bona fide temporary convenience.

Amendment 2 (a) put and agreed to.

Mr. T.J. O'Connell: In regard to my amendment No. 3, I would like if the Minister would look into the matter again and see if any provision can be inserted along the lines which Deputy Lemass suggested or otherwise, so as to make certain that such tenants will not be deprived of their rights.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: They are not deprived.

Mr. O'Connell: It depends on the court judge and the court decision, but there is nothing in the Act which will give them relief. They must have it [2398] litigated in the court. If they are not in a position to bear the expense of court proceedings a wealthy landlord may bring them from court to court and put them into a position in which they would have to drop their suit altogether. I quite see the Minister's objection and the danger of a time-limit of one or two years. There are cases where that would be unfair, but the Minister should look into it.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I shall, but, frankly speaking, I do not think that in retrospective cases it would be really possible, because, of course, there are cases of bona fide temporary convenience lettings which have been made before the passing of the Act.

Mr. Moore: Is it not the case that the phrase “temporary convenience” has been given a very wide meaning by the courts, and in the decided case of Cloncurry v. Finnerty a letting to a tenant for his own life has been held to be for temporary convenience? That is under the 1906 Act.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: Under the Land Acts, yes. Under the Land Acts temporary convenience would go very much further than under this Act. The leading case in regard to temporary convenience under the old Land Acts was that of a dower house or a letting until such time as there would be a widow to inhabit the dower house. There were other cases of that kind. I do not see how a letting for life could be regarded as a temporary convenience in the case of a business premises. Of course, every single one of these cases will have to be regarded by itself. It we put in a limit it would have to be a very lengthy limit.

Mr. Moore: I know that the commentators of the 1906 Act held that that phrase governed temporary convenience.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: No, that was decided under the old Land Acts. I do not see how you can put in a time limit, because the temporary convenience would alter.

An Ceann Comhairle: Shall I take the amendment as having been withdrawn at this stage?

[2399] Amendment No. 3 withdrawn.

Amendment No. 4 not moved.

Mr. Lemass: I move amendment No. 5:—

In page 4, line 5, to add after the word “return” the words “and shall include a fee farm grant.”

The necessity for this amendment arises out of Part 6 of the Bill which deals with covenants and leases. Restrictive covenants are frequently inserted in fee farm grants as well as in leases. If the amendment were not adopted by the House you might have the anomalous position that a person in occupation of a tenement for a number of years could, under this Bill, escape from restrictive covenants, whereas a person in occupation in perpetuity could not. I have been advised that this amendment is necessary.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: The ordinary fee farm is a leasehold. It is a curious position. Though the tenant is a fee simple owner, at the same time he is a tenant, and the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the owner of a fee farm—or feofee as he is called—and the tenant; that is the relation of landlord and tenant respectively. The relation of landlord and tenant exists in all cases of fee farm grants under the Renewable Leasehold Conversion Act and in the case of fee farms created after the passing of Deasy's Act. There are no other fee farms in existence as far as I know, and if there are the relation of landlord and tenant does not exist there at all. The ordinary fee farm relation of landlord and tenant exists, and is already covered. I do not think there are any other fee farm grants. I think the fee farm was unknown in Ireland until the Renewable Leasehold Conversion Act. In that case the relation of landlord and tenant would not exist at all, and here you are dealing with a Bill which deals with the relationship of landlord and tenant.

Mr. Lemass: The amendment I was told was necessary.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: However, I do not think it is any harm if the [2400] words go in, but I do not think they are in the least bit necessary.

Mr. Lemass: I would like if the Minister would agree to put it in and then he could examine the question afterwards.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I have examined it fully.

Mr. Lemass: I am informed that it is necessary. A number of cases in Monaghan, where there were restrictive covenants, were brought to my notice. I was told it would not be possible for the tenants to escape unless this was put in.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: They are not aware of the fact that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists in all fee farm grants and certainly in the case of fee farm grants under the Renewable Leasehold Conversion Act. I am perfectly willing to have the words in but they are entirely unnecessary in my opinion. They will not do any harm if they do go in.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Lemass: I move amendment 6:—

In page 4 to insert after the word “buildings”, line 15, the words “and any wires, pipes, or other conduits for the purpose of providing lighting, heating, or power for the use of the tenement or in connection therewith.”

This amendment relates to the definition of the word “improvement” which is as follows in the Bill:—

The word “improvement” when used in relation to a tenement means any addition or alteration to the buildings comprised in such tenement and includes any structure erected on such tenement which is ancillary or subsidiary to the said buildings but does not include work consisting only of repairing, painting, decorating or any of them;

The purpose of the amendment is to provide that the installation of wires for supplying electric light or power, or the installation of pipes for the supply of gas, should be an “improvement” in respect of which the tenant [2401] would be entitled to claim compensation. It is not clear from the definition in the Bill that the installation of light or gas or water would be included. I intended that my amendment would cover water, but it did not occur to me at the time that it was necessary to put it in. It is not clear that the installation of electricity, gas or water is an “improvement” under the Bill. Yet a tenant might have expended money and increased the letting value of a tenancy as the result of that expenditure. It seems to me desirable that the term “improvement” should be so defined as to cover such expenditure, and that the tenant who incurred such expenditure would be entitled to compensation when quitting the tenement.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I do not think that these words are in the slightest bit necessary, because obviously it is an “improvement” in a house to put in electric lighting or a bathroom. I do not like the particular form in which the Deputy is putting this forward. I will meet the Deputy if he withdraws his amendment, and I will undertake to put in a more expansive word than “improvement” on the Report Stage. When you are dealing with questions of this nature the danger is that if you put in words like those suggested by the Deputy you might cut down the general meaning of the word “improvement” in the section. That would be a question of interpretation. It may be said afterwards that that is what Parliament meant, little things of this nature and not big things. On the Report Stage I will bring in an amendment expanding the words and making it perfectly clear, though to my mind it is already clear that “improvements” such as the Deputy is suggesting shall be included.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed:

“That Section 2 as amended stand part of the Bill.”

Professor Thrift: I want to ask the Minister, in view of the words he used [2402] on the Second Reading of the Bill, whether it is, as he said, perfectly clear that he did not intend the Bill to apply to tenants covered by the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts. The Minister then said: “I might also point out that the Increase of Rent Act applies to rooms as well as to whole houses.” I want to ask the Minister if the effect of this amendment now will be practically to perpetuate sub-tenancies, and give people the right to retain those rooms by the rights conferred on them by this Bill.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: There are no such rights to retain here. I want to make this clear. There are two problems before us. The first problem is the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Act, a problem which is temporary. The other is a permanent problem with which this Bill is dealing. When the Increase of Rent Act expires all rights to possession under the Act will cease, and all the rights to compensation will necessarily cease. But the persons who had been tenants and whose tenancies expire and who hold on under the provisions of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts will be entitled to take advantage of the provisions of this Act just as if their interest in the premises was not an interest dependent on the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts solely. For instance, if you have a premises, and a notice to quit is served on the tenants, and the tenant holds on after the expiration of the tenancy under the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts, and if you have another premises exactly the same and held under the same title as the one in which notice to quit has been served, and the tenant is holding on under a contract of tenancy, in both these instances they will come under this Act. It will only be people who can take advantage of this Act as it stands who will be able to benefit. It does not increase the number or the class of persons. It only means persons who would be able to take advantage of it if their tenancies had not been determined by [2403] notice to quit. They will not be debarred now from coming in under the Act.

Professor Thrift: Would it not mean that the holder of a room in a tenement becomes, by virtue of this provision, the holder of a contract implied by virtue of the existing statute, whereas he would not have been so considered before?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: Not at all. Persons holding single rooms do not necessarily hold them under the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts, and any person who holds under an ordinary contract of tenancy, and who is entitled to come under this Act will be equally entitled if he holds under the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts.

Professor Thrift: That does not answer my point. My point is that the person who holds, and continues to hold his tenancy, by virtue of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts becomes, under this section, entitled to continue that tenancy.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: He is put in exactly the same position as if he were holding under a contract of tenancy. He has to hold under a contract of tenancy or under the statute. The person holding under the statute is not put in a better position than the person holding under a contract of tenancy.

Professor Thrift: His tenancy will last for the life of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: Yes, and until he is put out under that Act his claim for compensation for disturbance cannot arise.

Mr. O'Connell: I think it would be well if we could get the views of the Minister on the point we were discussing at the beginning; that is, a definition of an urban area. The Minister heard the point raised by Deputy Lemass and the difficulty of finding a legal definition of the word village.

[2404] Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: There is no definition. A village is simply a small cluster of houses. Where it stops or does not stop would be a matter for the court to decide.

Mr. Lemass: There have been certain legal decisions on that point.

Mr. O'Connell: I do not know whether we should leave the matter so vague as that. I do not think we should. Is it the Minister's view that a house at a certain crossroads would be included?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: No.

Mr. O'Connell: Then it will have to be left to the court to decide whether or not such a house will be included.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: The Deputy has referred to a house standing by itself at a crossroads. The Deputy obviously means an isolated country crossroads. The corner of Grafton Street might be deemed a crossroads. If a house is standing by itself at an isolated country crossroads it would not come within the provision.

Mr. O'Connell: The question might arise as to how far it stands away from another house.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I do not think that any houses of the class the Deputy has in mind would be included. I do not know that there has been any request that such houses should be included, but I bow to the ruling of the Chair.

Mr. Lemass: If we can find a way of getting around the ruling of the Chair will the Minister accept an amendment to put in a definition of “village” that will include such houses as Deputy O'Connell refers to?

An Ceann Comhairle: There is no evidence that that would be contrary to the ruling of the Chair. A definition of the word “village” would not be contrary to the ruling of the Chair.

Mr. Lemass: Now that the Minister has received that assurance from the Chair, will he consider a definition of the word “village” so as to bring in [2405] the type of house for which this Bill was obviously intended, but that accidentally happens to be half a mile outside a village and is, therefore, outside the scope of this Bill?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: The Deputy is really asking me to define what a village means.

Mr. Lemass: I want to be clear as to what is a village. Deputy O'Connell says that in Mayo any group of houses is called a village. There has already been a court decision that five houses grouped together do not constitute a village, yet that group of houses would be called a village in Mayo. The courts have determined that five houses in a group do not constitute a village. Would ten houses constitute a village?

Mr. O'Connell: How near must the houses be in order to constitute a village?

Mr. Little: I suggest that a village is any house held under a tenancy which does not come under the Land Acts. Let us say that a farmer at a cross-roads builds a house, and he lets that house to a publican or shopkeeper. In the case of the publican or the shopkeeper the conditions are exactly the same as in any village or town. In those circumstances I think that the tenant of the house should be entitled to exactly the same rights and privileges as any person in a village. He does not come under the Land Acts, and, therefore, he should come under the Town Tenants Act.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I am afraid I cannot define a village as being simply a single house.

Captain Redmond: I would like to put it to Deputy Lemass that, when he asks for a definition of “village,” is it not quite possible that by defining “village” he would be limiting the scope of the Bill? I suggest it is better to leave the term in a somewhat vague state. There have been cases under the Land Acts where land in the vicinity of towns or villages has been held to be agricultural land. I suggest that Deputies should be very wary about putting in any strict definition of “village.”

Mr. Lemass: I can see the danger, [2406] and that is why I propose to amend the Bill by deleting that particular definition. It seems to me that Deputy Little has suggested a means of getting the term “village” defined without any risk of danger. He suggests that “village” should relate to a holding which is not affected by the Land Acts. This Bill is, to my mind, intended to apply to any such holding.

Dr. O'Higgins: The occupier of a particular house built by a farmer at a cross-roads, as suggested by Deputy Little just now, might be brought inside the Bill as a tenant, but if we call his holding a village that man would then be the owner of a village, and he would automatically become a landlord.

Mr. Lemass: He would really be the tenant of a village.

Mr. O'Connell: We should be clear as to what we ourselves mean. We have not had it very clearly from the Minister as to whether or not he intends the Bill to apply to such houses.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: As the Bill was originally drafted, it did not. It was meant to be a Town Tenants Bill simply, and it was not meant to include the class of house to which the Deputy refers.

Mr. O'Connell: The words “town tenants” were used only for temporary convenience. There is nothing sacred about the words “town tenants.” No argument has been put up to show why this particular tenant who lives at a crossroads and who is subject to the same conditions as if he lived in a village of eight or ten houses, should not be entitled to the same conveniences as the man who does happen to live in a village. If the House believes that he is so entitled, no matter where he lives, to the same benefits, and that he should be included, even though his house happens to be a quarter of a mile from another house, it ought not to be beyond our ability so to frame our Bill as to make it apply in his case. I think if we were clear on that point we could then leave it to the Minister, either by fixing up the definition clause or otherwise, to get that provided for.

[2407] Mr. Little: I would suggest something like this to the Minister for his consideration. At the end of “village” words like this might be put in: “And shall include any tenancy not held under the Land Acts.”

Mr. O'Connell: That is the urban area.

Mr. Little: Urban area is used for the purpose of including everything under this Act under the term of urban area as it is used in the Title. It is a notional area. In a sense it applies to certain rights and duties and not to any geographical matter. We do not want tenancies to fall between two stools.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I will consider the matter. There would be very few cases, indeed, I think. I will see if there is any method of dealing with them.

Mr. Lemass: The Minister has stated there are very few cases. I want to give my experience. My remarks on this particular subject on the Second Reading of this Bill were reported in the Press, and I have received a number of letters from all over the country from people who think that they will fall between two stools and will not come under the Land Act or this Act. There are also a number of followers of the Minister's Party in the same position and I advised them to write to him.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: They certainly did not write to me, for which I am greatly obliged to the Deputy.

Question agreed to.

SECTION 3.

Where the buildings on any land or premises were erected by a local authority under the Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland) Acts, 1890 to 1919, or the Labourers (Ireland) Acts, 1883 to 1930, the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say:—

(a) if such land or premises is or are held by such local authority in fee simple, this Act shall [2408] not apply in respect of such land or premises;

(b) if such land or premises is or are held by such local authority under a lease, such local authority shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be the tenant of such land or premises and to be in exclusive occupation thereof.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I move amendment 7:—

In line 33, to delete the word “erected” and substitute the word “provided.”

Amendment 7 is largely a drafting amendment. The word, as it stands, is “erected,” but “provided” is a more accurate word because under the Working Classes and Labourers Act houses could be acquired as well as built. This takes in both houses acquired and built.

Amendment put and agreed to.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I move amendment 8:—

In line 35, to delete the figures “1919” and substitute the figures “1921.”

It is only a verbal amendment.

Amendment put, and agreed to.

Mr. Lemass: On the section. I would like to know what is the exact legal significance of the description of the section which appears on the margin. If it has any significance we must change it at once because it is inadequate. It relates to the first sub-section and not to the second.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: What does the Deputy mean?

Mr. Lemass: The marginal note says: “Exclusion of certain lands and premises held by local authorities.” Sub-section (a) relates to the exclusion of lands. Sub-section (b) relates to the inclusion of lands. I do not know if the note has any significance. If it has it should be amended.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: Marginal notes do not count in the interpretation of the Bill. As a matter of fact I think it is an accurate marginal note.

[2409] An Ceann Comhairle: I do not purport to give a legal interpretation, but I can tell the Deputy that we are not passing the marginal note; we are passing the section.

Section 3, as amended, put and agreed to.

Question—“That Sections 4 and 5 stand part of the Bill”—put and agreed to.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I move amendment 9.

Before Section 6 to insert a new section as follows:—

Where a person retains possession of a tenement by virtue of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Acts, 1923 to 1930, the tenancy arising by virtue of those Acts on such retention shall, for the purposes of this Act (whether such retention began before or after the passing of this Act), be deemed to be a continuation of the tenancy on the termination of which such retention began.

The proposed new section simply carries on the tenancy which he has in existence before the ejectment notice was served upon him. It makes it a graft upon his old tenancy, a continuation of his old tenancy.

Mr. Lemass: I would like the Minister to examine whether the term “tenancy” is right. A tenant is not a tenant in consequence of his tenancy but in consequence of his rights of occupation.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: As a matter of fact we are perfectly entitled to define a tenancy in any fashion we like. It is perfectly correct here.

Mr. Good: Would the Minister say if the object of this clause is to make permanent the disabilities of the Rent Restrictions Act?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: No, it does not affect the Rent Restrictions Act at all. It only means that when the Rent [2410] Restrictions Act expires a person who has held on under the Rent Restrictions Act shall be in the same position as a person who held on under a contract of tenancy which has not expired.

Professor Thrift: That is, it really ante-dates this Act by the number of years which have elapsed since the Rent Restrictions Act was passed.

Mr. J.J. Byrne: What does Deputy Thrift want? Does he want to exclude such tenants? If he does it is a most inequitable proposition.

Professor Thrift: I want to know the meaning of what we are doing.

Mr. Good: Does this make permanent the regulations of the Rent Restrictions Act, in other words to continue them after the Rent Restrictions Act has been withdrawn?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: No. When the Rent Restrictions Acts have been withdrawn then the rights which they conferred upon certain persons shall cease, but those persons shall have rights under this Act exactly the same as persons holding under a contract of tenancy would have. I took an instance a few moments ago. Supposing there are two tenants of two similar houses held under the same rent and under the same landlord. In one case a notice to quit has been served and the tenant has shown that he comes under the Rent Restrictions Act and remains on in possession under the provisions of that Act. In the other case the person remains on under his original contract of tenancy. The rights of those two individuals are exactly the same under this Act. That is all it does.

Professor Thrift: I have been trying to make myself clear, but I cannot avoid thinking that what I have said is absolutely accurate. If the Rent Restrictions Act had never been passed certain tenants would have lost their tenancy under the old Act. Now by virtue of this new amendment we get the benefit of this Act which is the same as if the Act had been passed at the date the Rent Restrictions [2411] Act was passed. That is to say, to that extent the Act has been made retrospective.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: The tenancies created under the Rent Restrictions Act are to be in exactly the same position as other tenancies. In other words, the involuntary and the voluntary tenants are to be on the same footing.

Amendment put and agreed to.

Orderd that the new section be inserted in the Bill.

SECTION 6.

“The Minister for Justice may by order make regulations prescribing any form, matter, or thing which is in this Act referred to as prescribed or to be prescribed.”

Mr. J. Wolfe: I move amendment 10:

In line 12, after the word “Justice” to insert the words “after consultation with the President of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland.”

In doing so, I only ask the Dáil to follow the precedents of the various Land Acts during the last fifty years. The precedents have been found to work most satisfactorily. It is to avoid friction of any sort that the regulations are submitted to the President of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland. He then is in a position to express his views on them. We ask that that be done here, and if the Minister would see his way to follow the precedents to which I allude he will be following precedents that have worked out very well in practice.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I will agree to the Deputy's amendment.

Amendment put and agreed to.

Section 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Derrig: Are these regulations to be laid on the Table of the House?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: No.

Mr. Lemass: In view of the introduction of the influence to be given to [2412] the President of the Incorporated Law Society, I think they should be. We might trust the Minister alone, but we would not trust him in such company.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: It is being done under many other statutes.

Sections 7 and 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

SECTION 9.

Mr. Lemass: I move:

To add at the end of the section a new sub-section as follows:—

“The amount of compensation payable under this section shall be a charge on the estate or interest of the landlord in the tenement in priority to all other charges, mortgages or incumbrances thereon.”

The Bill makes the compensation awarded to a tenant under Part II a personal charge against the landlord. The landlord may be a man of straw who has mortgaged his interest in the tenement up to the hilt. It seems to us that some protection should be afforded to the tenant in such cases. That is why we suggest the addition of this sub-section to the effect that the amount of compensation payable under this section shall be a charge on the estate or interest of the landlord in the tenement in priority to all other charges, mortgages or incumbrances thereon. It seems reasonable that the amount of compensation awarded to the tenant in respect of improvements made by the tenant in a particular dwelling should be a charge upon the improved dwelling. That is what the amendment seeks to provide, and I trust the Minister will be able to accept it.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: There is another similar amendment to this introduced by the Deputy later on. They stand on very different footings. As far as this amendment is concerned, I am willing to accept the principle of it, but the Deputy must not take that as a precedent for the principle being applied later on.

Mr. Lemass: I recognise that.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: Because here [2413] undoubtedly the premises have been improved by the tenant's work. He has expended money on that, and he should get the amount of the money. The premises will fall into the owner's hands improved by the amount of the tenant's work and his expenditure. That is assessed by the court. I agree that it is fair that they should be a first charge upon the premises. Subject to small redrafting, I would accept the principle. If the Deputy withdraws the amendment I will bring it on again. Later on there are different considerations.

Mr. Lemass: I agree.

Professor Thrift: Is not that likely to affect very much certain prior charges?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I do not think this amendment will. The security has been increased by the amount of the tenant's improvement.

Professor Thrift: It might afterwards be nothing.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: At the expiration of his term the court will assess what the value of the improvement is. If a house which is worth, let me say, £1,000, becomes, owing to the tenant's improvement, worth £1,100 I think it is quite reasonable that the tenant should get his £100 out of the premises, and £1,000 is left for the landlord or his mortgagees, as the case may be.

Professor Thrift: Would you lend money on it yourself?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I have no money to lend.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed: “That Section 9 stand part of the Bill.”

Mr. Lemass: I want to know from the Minister why the limitation of ten years was put in sub-section (2): “A landlord of a tenement who holds such tenement under a lease or other contract of tenancy shall be entitled on giving up possession of such tenement on the expiration of his lease or tenancy therein to be paid by his immediate [2414] superior landlord compensation for improvements under this Act within ten years before such expiration.” What particular purpose is it intended to serve? I do not see the purpose of having that limitation there, if, in fact, when the immediate landlord surrenders the tenancy the letting value has been increased.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: The principle is that after a certain time the value of the improvements will have passed away.

Mr. Lemass: In that case there would be no compensation.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: This is where a middle landlord is surrendering to a head landlord. Then he is entitled to receive from his head landlord the value of any improvements that he has paid his direct tenant for.

Mr. Lemass: “Within ten years before the expiration of his own tenancy.” What is the purpose of the limitation?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: The reason is that he has had the enjoyment of the tenant's improvement for that particular period, and the period during which he has enjoyed it and during which his immediate tenant would have enjoyed it, would be sufficient to wear out the value of the improvement.

Mr. Lemass: He may have paid fifteen times the annual increased letting value. Should it not be fifteen years, therefore?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: In a subsequent section it may be awarded up to fifteen times the annual letting value, but the Deputy is correct in that. What suggestion has the Deputy got to make?

Mr. Lemass: I do not propose to amend it. I thought there might be some reason for that limitation of which I was not aware.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: The only limitation is the presumption that he has fully enjoyed the value of it.

Mr. Lemass: Obviously he would not have fully enjoyed the value if the [2415] court compelled him to pay in compensation fifteen times the annual value of the improvement. The court would not have fixed it at fifteen times unless they were satisfied that the improvement was going to last for fifteen years. Yet he has to pay within ten years himself in order to get compensation on surrendering his own tenancy.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I will look into it.

Mr. Lemass: I am not going to defend the interests of the landlord.

Question put and agreed to.

SECTION 10.

(1) The amount of compensation for improvements in any particular case shall (subject to the provisions of this section) be the capitalised value of such addition to the letting value of the tenement at the termination of the tenancy as the court shall determine to be attributable to the improvement which is the subject of such compensation.

(2) Where the compensation for an improvement is payable to a tenant by his landlord and the court is satisfied that such tenant and (where applicable) his predecessors in title or any of them has or have received from the landlord benefits by way of reduction of rent or otherwise in consideration, expressly or impliedly, of such improvement being or having been made, the court shall deduct from the compensation for such improvement as ascertained under the foregoing sub-section of this section such sum as the court shall think proper in respect of such benefits.

(3) Where the compensation for an improvement is payable to a landlord by his superior landlord, the court shall make such deduction (if any) from such compensation as ascertained under the first sub-section of this section as the court shall think proper in respect of benefits received by such landlord and (where applicable) his predecessors in title or any of them by way of increased rent or otherwise on account of such improvement.

[2416] (4) The capitalised value for the purposes of this section of an addition to the letting of a tenement shall be fixed by the court having regard to the probable duration of such addition, the probable life of the improvement, and all other relevant circumstances, but shall not in any case exceed fifteen times the annual amount of such addition.

Mr. T.J. O'Connell: I move amendment 12:—At the end of sub-section (1), line 53, to add the words “or the actual amount expended on improvements by the tenant, whichever is the greater.” The section provides for the capitalised addition to the letting value. There may be cases where owing to the shortage of houses and other various reasons the house is let in a bad condition and a considerable amount of money will be required to bring the house up to the ordinary habitable standard. It might transpire at the end of twelve or fifteen years that the letting value of the house, judged in the way it is supposed to be judged under the Act, would not be very much increased at all, if anything. The tenant was compelled owing to circumstances, the shortage of houses or that sort of thing, to expend a considerable amount of money on repairs. He might find at the end of his term that he would get nothing at all for the money he had spent, because the letting value, judged on normal conditions of supply and demand, would not be increased beyond what he had paid for it under the stress of shortage. It seems fair that he should get the actual amount he expended on the house by way of compensation.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I cannot follow the Deputy in this. It appears to me that the case in which the tenant should get the amount that he has actually expended would be very rare indeed. The tenant makes improvements and for many years he gets the value of these improvements. According to this statement, when the improvements are, so to speak, run out and when the benefit is almost entirely gone, he is to get the full value of the money which he expended upon it. That would appear to be most inequitable [2417] and unjust. Suppose the tenant spent £100 on improvements and at the end of his time the value of the improvements is gone—they only add a shilling or two shillings to the annual letting value—yet the tenant is to get £100, according to the Deputy. The landlord has to pay £100 for which he is getting nothing. That would not appear to me to be fair. The principle underlying the Bill is that for what a tenant has done to the premises and which the landlord gets, the landlord should pay; but the landlord should only pay for what he actually acquires —the value of the tenant's improvements which he is getting. He should not pay for the value of improvements the entire of which the tenant has exhausted or portion of which the tenant has exhausted. He should only pay for the value of the improvements which he actually gets.

Mr. O'Connell: Yes, but the money that the tenant has expended may be such as to bring the house up to a habitable condition. The letting value of the house under the conditions set out here will not be altogether greater than it was under the stress of shortage at the time the tenant acquired it, and in that case, although the tenant has expended money upon it, he will be entitled to get no compensation whatever.

Mr. Lemass: I agree that it would not be possible to pass the amendment in its present form, because, as the Minister said, portion of the improvements may be entirely exhausted by the time the tenancy is surrendered— not completely exhausted. The landlord should be only asked to pay compensation if the letting value has been increased and the amount of compensation should be in direct relation to the increase in the letting value. There is a special situation existing here to which Deputy O'Connell referred, although this amendment does not deal with it, and that is that rents are declining and we may anticipate a continuous decline over a large number of years. I may rent a house now and expend a considerable sum of money on improving it. At the end of fifteen [2418] years, in consequence of the decline in rents, the letting value of the house, although I have improved it, might in the circumstances existing of normal competition in the year 1946 be no greater than the letting value now, in which case I would lose whatever value I created as a result of the improvements.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I think there is a big fallacy in Deputy O'Connell's and Deputy Lemass's argument and it is this: that the letting value is the letting value at the time at which the assessment is made, not the original letting value. Suppose a case comes into court in 1932, what the court will decide will be the letting value of the house in the year 1932 without that improvement, and the letting value plus the improvement. Then it will take the value of the difference and capitalise it and give it to the tenant. The fallacy is that you are taking the rent as being, say, the 1915 rent, when it is the rent which would be assessed in 1932.

Mr. Moore: Is the Minister not satisfied that the basis which the court will adopt in deciding the increase of the letting value will be the rent at which it has been let?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: No. It will be the rent at the date on which the court makes its inquiry. Suppose a case comes into court in 1932, it will take the increased letting value of the premises in the year 1932 owing to the improvement made, and the increased letting value in the year 1932 will have no relation at all to what was the actual letting value of the premises in 1915 or in 1910.

Mr. Moore: The increased letting value will be relevant to the rent that has prevailed up to 1932.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: No.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments 13 and 14 not moved.

Professor Thrift: I move amendment 15:—

In sub-section (4), line 12, page 6, to delete the word “fifteen” and substitute the word “twelve.”

[2419] I suppose the Minister fixed on fifteen years because it was the figure used in connection with the Land Acts —fifteen years' purchase. This Bill applies to something which is of a much more perishable character than land. I have made inquiries and I am informed definitely that the basis on which these rents would sell would be from ten to twelve and a half years. Fifteen years' purchase is entirely too high a figure, and I suggest that the Minister should substitute twelve. It is as much as these will be worth.

Captain Redmond: Surely the Deputy reads the sub-section to mean that that is the maximum, and that it will be for the court to determine what it considers to be the full value.

Professor Thrift: The court will be guided by what we put in as a maximum.

Mr. Morrissey: Surely the Deputy would not suggest that from ten to twelve and a half years' purchase is the usual figure?

Professor Thrift: I do in open sale.

Mr. Byrne: I wonder where the Deputy got his figures. I do not know a single case in the City of Dublin where that basis has been fixed, and I ask the Minister not to accept the amendment. The system of compensation in the Bill at present is exceedingly rigid and, as Deputy Redmond has properly pointed out, the fifteen years mentioned in the Bill is only the maximum figure and it lies in the discretion of the court absolutely to give only one-half or one-fourth or one-third, as the court may think fit. I do not think that by any stretch of imagination the House could say that tenants under this Bill are receiving anything like a liberal measure of compensation for the money they spent, and to reduce this figure to twelve, as Deputy Thrift suggests, would be extremely unfair.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I personally do not think that the figure fifteen can do any harm. I do not agree with Deputy Thrift that the court will approximate necessarily to the maximum except in very rare cases. There may be [2420] cases in which the court would go up to the maximum, hut I think they would be very rare indeed. This gives full discretion to the court and I think you can trust the court not to give an undue amount to the tenant. For the money he has expended, fifteen years' purchase would not give him a very large interest.

Professor Thrift: I do not attach a great deal of importance to this for the reason Deputy Redmond and the Minister gave, that it is the maximum, but I do think that the fact that we are putting that figure into the Bill will be a sort of headline for judgment to be assessed by. I stick to what I have said. I am informed definitely that in a specific instance of a business premises in Henry Street a well-secured ground rent was put up for sale and it brought in only twelve years' purchase.

Captain Redmond: If the Deputy has been informed that these ground rents only realise twelve years' purchase surely the court will be informed of that also?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: And the market value may alter.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Section 10 put and agreed to.

SECTION 11.

(1) Where the tenant of a tenement proposes to make an improvement to such tenement he may serve on such landlord a notice (in this Act referred to as an improvement notice) in the prescribed form and consisting of the following documents, that is to say:

(a) a statement in the prescribed form of the intention to make such improvement, and

(b) plans and a specification of such improvement, and

(c) an estimate, verified by an architect or surveyor, of the cost of making such improvement.

(2) Where an improvement notice is served on the landlord of a tenement, such landlord may, within one month after such service, serve on the tenant of such tenement any one [2421] but not more than one of the following notices, that is to say:-

(a) a notice (in this Act referred to as an improvement consent) in the prescribed form consenting to the making of such improvement; or

(b) a notice (in this Act referred to as an improvement undertaking) in the prescribed form undertaking to execute such improvement in consideration of either (as such landlord shall state in such notice) a specified increase of rent or an increase of rent to be fixed by the court; or

(c) a notice (in this Act referred to as an improvement objection) in the prescribed form objecting to such improvement on grounds specified in such notice.

(3) Where a landlord on whom an improvement notice has been served holds the tenement in relation to which such notice was served either under a lease of which less than twenty-five years are unexpired at the date of the service of such notice or under a tenancy from year to year or any lesser tenancy, such landlord shall within one week after the service of such improvement notice on him serve such improvement notice or a copy thereof on his immediate superior landlord, and such immediate superior landlord may within one month after the date of the service of such improvement notice by the tenant on the landlord serve on the landlord and on the tenant either an improvement consent or an improvement objection.

(4) Every superior landlord on whom an improvement notice or a copy thereof is served under this section (including this sub-section) and who holds the tenement to which such notice relates under a lease of which less than twenty-five years are unexpired at the date of such service or under a tenancy from year to year or any lesser tenancy, shall within one week after such service serve such improvement notice (or such copy thereof) or a copy thereof on his next superior landlord, and such next superior landlord shall have the like [2422] right of serving an improvement consent or an improvement objection as such first-mentioned superior landlord has under this section (including this sub-section).

(5) Every improvement notice or copy of an improvement notice which is served under this section on a superior landlord shall have endorsed thereon a statement of the date on which such improvement notice was served on the landlord of the tenement to which such notice relates.

Mr. T.J. O'Connell: I move amendment 16:

In sub-section (1) (c), line 22, after the word “surveyor” to insert the words “or building contractor.”

I put this amendment down because the case was put to me that in some rural areas it is not always easy to get the service of an architect or a surveyor, and it was thought that an estimate submitted by a building contractor should be sufficient.

Mr. Lemass: I think that is in accord with the report of the Town Tenants Commission.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I agree.

Amendment agreed to.

Professor Thrift: I move amendment 17:

In sub-section (2), line 25, to delete the words “one month” and substitute the words “three months.”

This is one of a number of amendments that I put forward with the very definite object of curtailing so far as possible appeals to the courts. The Minister said he was anxious as far as possible to avoid litigation. I am informed that the periods here mentioned are in practice and as shown by experience entirely and utterly too short, and that application would have to be made to have the periods mentioned therein extended. I think that applies almost universally throughout the Bill. In practice, longer periods of time will be required for the different operations referred to in the various sections of the Bill. I move the extension contained in my present amendment.

[2423] Mr. Lemass: Does Deputy Thrift think that one month is too short a period for a landlord to make up his mind whether he is going to agree to an improvement notice or to object to it, or to carry it out himself? Surely a person who cannot make up his mind in one month will not be able to make it up in three.

Professor Thrift: But very complicated inquiries may be necessary.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I do not think there is any desperate hurry in getting ordinary improvements done. If the experience of persons is that time of this nature would be required I do not see any reason why the time should not be given. I know myself it will take a certain amount of time to have complaints examined and looked into, and if people do want a reasonable time to do things and not to be rushed we ought to give it to them.

Mr. Lemass: Surely it is hardly fair to the tenant that he should have to wait three months before he learns the fate of his improvement notice. I think the tenant's interest should be looked to also.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: Certainly.

Mr. Lemass: I cannot see in what circumstances, except in very exceptional cases, the landlord, unless he was deliberately putting the thing off, would require more than a month's notice.

Professor Thrift: I am thinking of the tenant as much as anybody else. If a month is too short to get the necessary information the tenant may have to go to the court to prevent the time being extended.

Mr. Lemass: This relates to the period after the tenant has sent his notice to the landlord. The tenant may have been preparing plans for years.

Professor Thrift: If he has three months extra what matter?

Mr. Lemass: No, the landlord has three months.

[2424] Mr. Good: The landlord is only to get one month to consider what the tenant has taken years to consider.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I do not think the tenant or the landlord will be in a desperate hurry. They both will want a considerable time. I suggest that the House should accept this amendment.

Mr. Lemass: Will Deputy Thrift compromise upon two months?

Professor Thrift: Yes.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I shall not prevent such an amicable bargain.

An Ceann Comhairle: The amendment will be altered to read: “In sub-section (2), line 25, to delete the words `one month' and substitute the words `two months'.”

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

Professor Thrift: I move amendment 18:—

In sub-section (3), line 45, to delete the word “week” and substitute the word “month.”

Mr. Lemass: This relates only to a formality. Where the landlord who receives an improvement notice is not concerned with it he is required within a week to send it on to his superior landlord. Surely that does not require consideration for a month.

Professor Thrift: I think it does.

Mr. Lemass: Surely the landlord will not take a month to find out whether his lease has less than twenty-five years to run.

Professor Thrift: I stand by what I said. I think it is as necessary in this case as in the other.

Mr. Lemass: It is purely a formality. The section provides that if the landlord's lease has less than twenty-five years to run he can send it on to the superior landlord. It does not take more than a week to ascertain that.

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: The man might be out of the country, or a whole lot of other things might happen.

[2425] Amendment agreed to.

Professor Thrift: I move amendment 19, with the change of “two months” for “three months,” as in amendment 18:-

In sub-section (3), line 48, to delete the words “one month” and substitute the words “two months.”

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

Section 11, as amended, agreed to.

SECTION 12.

(1) Where a tenant has served an improvement notice on his landlord and such landlord has not, within one month after such service, served on such tenant an improvement undertaking in respect of such improvement notice and neither such landlord nor any superior landlord has, within such month, served on such tenant an improvement objection in respect of such improvement notice, the tenant shall be entitled to execute at any time within one year after such service (whether an improvement consent has or has not been served by such landlord or superior landlord) the improvement specified in such improvement notice in accordance in all respects with such notice.

(2) References in this Act to a tenant being entitled on consent to execute an improvement shall be construed as referring to such tenant being entitled under this section to execute such improvement.

Professor Thrift: I move amendment 20, subject to the same amendment, namely, the substitution of the words “two months” for “three months,” as in amendments 18 and 19:

In sub-section (1), line 5, to delete the words “one month” and substitute the words “two months,” and in line 8 to delete the word “month” and substitute the words “two months.”

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

Question proposed: “That Section 12, as amended, stand part of the Bill.”

[2426] Mr. Lemass: On the section I want it to be clear what would be the position in the event of there being four landlords or two landlords. I do not think it is likely, but if it did occur would not the position be complicated? Take it that there are two landlords; each has a month to forward the improvement notice, and the tenant, at any rate, must learn within two months what the fate of his notice is to be. No great complication would arise in that case, but if there were three landlords what would happen?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: Undoubtedly it might take a considerable amount of time, but I do not see how you can possibly get over it if there are various interests to be consulted, but in fact that will happen very seldom.

Mr. Lemass: That is not my point. Where a tenant has served an improvement notice, and that notice is forwarded from one landlord to another, this section, as now amended, provides that the tenant must learn the ultimate fate of his improvement notice in two months. If there are three landlords, each has a month in which to forward the improvement notice, so that it will be three months before the three receive it, and it cannot possibly be decided in two months. Then what is to be done? The section will have to be re-drafted so as to fix the time subsequent to the last day on which the final landlord will have received it.

Question put and agreed to.

SECTION 13.

Where a tenant has served an improvement notice on his landlord and such landlord has within one month after such service served on such tenant an improvement undertaking in respect of such improvement notice and no superior landlord has within such month served on such tenant an improvement objection in respect of such improvement notice, the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say :-

(a) such tenant may, by notice in writing served on such landlord within fourteen days after the service of such improvement undertaking, [2427] either accept such improvement undertaking or withdraw the improvement notice served by him, or, where such improvement undertaking specifies an increase of rent, object to the amount of such increase;

(b) where such tenant does not within the said fourteen days serve any notice under the foregoing paragraph or such tenant duly accepts such improvement undertaking, such landlord shall, as soon as may be after the expiration of such fourteen days, execute at his own expense and in accordance with such improvement undertaking the improvement mentioned therein and may for that purpose enter on the tenement at all reasonable times and there do all things necessary for or incidental to the execution of such improvement;

(c) if such tenant duly withdraws in accordance with this section the improvement notice served by him, such notice shall for all purposes be deemed never to have been served;

(d) where such tenant duly objects in accordance with this section to the amount of the increase of rent specified in such improvement undertaking, then

(i) such landlord and such tenant may either fix by agreement the amount of such increase of rent or agree that the amount of such increase of rent shall be fixed by the Court, and thereupon such improvement undertaking shall have effect in accordance with such agreement and be deemed to have been duly accepted in accordance with this section by such tenant, or

(ii) either such landlord or such tenant may apply to the Court and upon the hearing of such application the Court may, as it shall think proper, either fix the amount of such increase [2428] of rent or deem such improvement undertaking to be an improvement objection and deal with it accordingly or make such other order as justice may require;

(e) which such improvement undertaking is, by its terms or by subsequent agreement, made subject to an increase of rent of an amount to be fixed by the Court, such landlord or such tenant may when the improvement has been duly executed by such landlord apply to the Court to fix the amount of such increase of rent and thereupon the Court shall fix such amount accordingly;

(f) upon the completion of such improvement by such landlord in accordance with such improvement undertaking and this section, the rent payable by such tenant to such landlord shall, as from the date of such completion, be increased in accordance with such undertaking or the order of the Court (as the case may be), and any dispute as to the amount or commencement of or otherwise in relation to such increase shall be determined by the Court on the application of such landlord or such tenant;

(g) where such landlord is bound under this section to execute the improvement in accordance with such improvement undertaking but fails or neglects so to do within a reasonable time, such tenant may apply to the Court and the Court may make such order in the matter as justice may require.

Professor Thrift: I move amendment 21 where the same point of substituting “two months” for “three months” comes in.

In line 20, to delete the words “one month” and substitute the words “two months” and in line 23 to delete the word “month” and substitute the words “two months.”

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

[2429] Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I move amendment 22:—

In paragraph (b), page 7, line 36, to delete the words “as soon as may be” and substitute the words “within two months,” and in line 37 after the word “execute” to insert the words “and complete.”

Of course, I frankly admit there may be very considerable differences of opinion as to the time required but there is, I think, general agreement that a definite period for the carrying out of the improvement should be fixed. I suggest in this amendment that all improvements should be fixed and executed within a period of two months after the agreement is arrived at. If Deputies think that two months is too short we can consider that. I am not tied down to the two months, but I think it is highly desirable that a particular period should be fixed rather than some indefinite reasonable time.

Mr. Lemass: Would a building contractor be able to escape his obligations by locking out his men and saying that there was a trade dispute on?

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney: I am afraid that would have to go to