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Dáil Éireann - Volume 29 - 01 May, 1929

In Committee on Finance. - Vote 64—Army.

The President: I move:—

Go ndeontar suim ná raghaidh thar £917,521 chun slánuithe na suime is gá chun íochta an Mhuirir a thiocfidh chun bheith iníochta i rith na bliana dar críoch an 31adh lá de Mhárta, 1930, chun Costas an Airm, maraon le Cúltaca an Airm.

That a sum not exceeding £917,521 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1930, for the cost of the Army, including Army Reserve.

Minister for Defence (Mr. Fitzgerald): I do not propose to say a great deal on this Estimate. Only a few months have elapsed since the previous Estimate was before the House, and I think it is only a month since the Army was under discussion here in connection with the Army Continuation Act. It will be noticed that there is a decrease in this Estimate of £361,912 from last year. That brings the total estimate to £1,442,521. It will be remembered that for the purpose of revenue collection the normal cost of the Army was estimated at £1,500,000. This is the first year that we got the cost of the Army down to what has been estimated as the normal cost; that is to say, the whole cost of the Army this year is met out of revenue and nothing is treated as exceptional expenditure. I rejoice very much both as a member of the Executive Council and as Minister for Defence that we have reached this position. As a member of the Executive Council it was quite evident that the position of meeting the cost of the Army—part of it—as capital expenditure [1158] could not be continued indefinitely, and as Minister for Defence it was quite evident to me that as long as the Army was paid for partly as an abnormal expenditure there could not be a proper feeling of stability in the Army. We have now reached normality with regard to expenditure, and I feel that the whole spirit of the Army will be imbued with a greater feeling of stability. The members of the Army will not now feel that part of their cost is being met as a capital expenditure, and that radical changes might have to take place possibly to their detriment.

As regards the strength of the Army, it will be remembered I stated that what I aimed at was approximately 500 officers and 5,000 other ranks. We have moved steadily in this direction. On 1st April last there were 502 officers and 6,474 other ranks as compared with 768 officers and 10,919 other ranks on 1st April, 1928. As I mentioned in the Dáil a short time ago, it is not intended to reduce the officers below the present figure. A stage has now been reached when officers can rely on security of tenure and can look forward to normal promotion as vacancies occur. Under these conditions there should be an incentive to each officer to become highly specialised in his sphere in the Army. Admission to the commissioned ranks will be by a system of cadetship. For these cadetships there will be open competitive examinations followed by an interview before a military selection board. The reduction in the number of officers was 266. Gratuities to the extent of two years' pay and allowances were granted to those officers who retired or resigned. The sum of £64,005 shown under sub-head A is, to a large extent, required to meet the cost of gratuities to officers who retired or resigned late in the financial year but whose claim for gratuities had not been investigated to admit of payment within the year. It will be noticed that we estimate for 6,000 other ranks. It is a figure that we estimate we can reach during the present financial year.

[1159] Consequent on the reduction of the strength of the Army it has been found desirable to concentrate troops in a limited number of districts. Certain posts have been evacuated. The number of district headquarters has been reduced from seven to four. This enables reductions in expenditure to be effected. An increase of approximately £9,000 will be observed in the capital expenditure on vehicles under sub-head J. Many of the lorries at present in use are from ten to fifteen years old, and the cost of maintenance has been heavy. Similarly, the ambulances have become unserviceable, and it is proposed to dispose of those and purchase new chassis. The bodies will be fitted in Army workshops. Tractors for artillery have become necessary, and the cost of those is included in the item for capital expenditure. In view of the purchases of these vehicles a considerable reduction in the number of cars in use has been effected. The cost of maintenance will be reduced, and there will be a decrease of 70 per cent. under this heading. To prevent any mistake I will take this opportunity of indicating that on page 289 of the Estimates, under the heading “Reserve of Officers— Annual Grants,” there is a printer's error. The figure £12,370 should read £12,870. It will be observed that the total at the bottom will be made correct by making the figure £12,870.

Proinnsias O Fathaigh: “Dá gcuirfeadh aoinne isteach orainn d'íocfadh sé as go daor”—b'é sin brí na cainnte a dhin Aire an Airgid an lá fá dheire. Táimuid ar aon aigne leis an Aire go mba chóir féachaint chuige go mbeidh fírinne sa sean-rá san. Cionnus a déanfar deimhin de'n dóchas san? Sin í an adhbh. An bhfuil, nó an mbeidh in ár gcumas cosg a chur le h-aon chomacht mhór ar theacht isteach? Níl agus ní bheidh. Ach is féidir linn an méid seo a dhéanamh gan aon agó—féachaint chuige nár bhfiú d'aon chomacht mhór an tír seo do choiméad fá [1160] chois ar feadh i bhfad. Ní féidir sin do dhéanamh agus na mílte saighduirí a bheith in aon dream amháin. Bheadh sé orainn troid mar a throideamar i mbliain a 1920 agus i mbliain a 1921 agus ní bheimis in ánn úsáid do bhainnt as na gunnaí móra atá ag an Arm fá láthair.

Gan amhras, tá gá le h-Arm acht ní gá ach sluagh beag mar arm seasta nó buan-arm—abair 3,000 nó 4,000. Taobh amuigh de sin, bheadh gá le 60,000 óganaigh no mar sin—daoine oilte a bheadh reidh an tír do chosaint. Ar a laighead, bheadh gá leis an uimhir sin. Chun iad-so do threorú, bheadh tuairim 500 oifigí ag teastáil. Ach ní ceart—seo rud nach bhfuilimíd ar aon intinn leis an Aire 'na thaobh—“paid reserve” a bheith ann. Ní dó linn gur ceart tuarastal do thabhairt do na daoine seo atá oilte chun an tír do chosaint. Nuair a bhí Bille na bhForsaí Cosanta ós ar gcóir, rinneas tagairt don rud a thárla sa Spáinn. Bhí tuairim 200,000 saighdúirí ag troid in Aifric thuaidh agus nuair a cuireadh deire leis an gcogadh, ní fhuair duine acu seo pinsean, ach tugadh obair éigin do gach duine acu. B'é sin an rud ceart. Do réir mo thuairime, is olc an rud d'óganach tuairim 30 blian d'aois, pinsean do thabhairt dó agus gan faic a bheith aige do dhéanamh. Is olc san don duine agus is olc é don náisiún.

Thiocfadh linn a lán do dhéanamh dá mbeadh misneach agus an spiorad fíor-náisiúnta ins na daoine. Níl aon amhras ná gur d'aon dream polaitíochtá furmhór mhór an Airm fá lathair. Ní ceart san. Dá mbeadh arm againn den tsaghas san agus é faoi smacht an Rialtais, ba mhaith an rud é—ach cead a bheith ag gach duine, is cuma ce'n sort polaitíochta atá aige, bheith san arm. Is dó linn go mba léór dúinn 3,000 no 4,000 saighdúirí mar bhuan-arm ach 60,000 ógánaigh a bheith tréineálta oilte in a dteannta agus sluagh oifigeach maith a bheith ullamh le n-a dtreorú.

Maidir leis na h-eilteaín ná baineann leis an Arm, tchidhim go [1161] bhfuil £10 tugtha, no le tabhairt, mar gheall orra. Ba mhaith liom fios d'fháil cad tá a dhéanamh mar gheall ar eilteáin i gcúrsaí tráchtala. Ba cheart cuidiú leis an obair sin ach is beag an síntiús so.

Bhí a lán dá dhuadh ar Aire an Airgid laghdú leath-mhilliún punt a dhéanamh sna meastacháin. D'fheudfái an oiread céadna a shabháil sna Vótanna so an Airm. Ba leor £1,000,000 do chaitheamh ar an Arm, agus an ceathrú cuid de mhiliún do chur leis nuair a cuirfear monarclainn púdair, piléar agus gunnaí ar bun. Ní cóir “paid reserves” a bheith ann—ach na mílte punt do chaitheadh orra do shábhail.

Mar gheall ar thaillte an Airm, tá a lán airgid ghá chaitheamh orra— £22,460. Ba mhaith liom fios d'fháil cé mhéid acra atá ann, cé'n cíos atá ortha agus cé leis go n-iochtar é.

Dá réir ar dtuairime, tá an iomad airgid ghá chaitheamh ar an Arm agus tairgim go gcuirtear an Vóta so ar gcúl idtreó go ndéanfar athsmaoineamh ar an sgéal.

Mr. Kerlin: I support the motion to refer back the Estimate for reconsideration. I am sure the few Deputies who are present now were present when the Minister for Finance introduced the Budget. In the course of his statement, the Minister painted a rosy picture in regard to the adoption of certain badly-needed reliefs to income tax payers with large families. Then, after raising. I suppose, false hopes, he deplored his inability to afford such relief through want of £100,000. If this Estimate is referred back for reconsideration, and if the Minister for Defence gets down to serious work on it, with his colleague the Minister for Finance, I am sure that the difficulty of obtaining at least the £100,000 required for that purpose would not be insurmountable. If the Minister for Finance arms himself with the economy axe, and if the Minister for Defence uses the pruning knife, I am sure that between the two they will be able to clip the wings of the Army Estimate a little more closely. I am sure that I am on fairly [1162] common ground when I welcome such reductions as have been effected since last year, reductions which, I may say, are very much overdue. These reductions should have been carried out during the past two or three years. The attitude of the Opposition Party in this House in asking for reductions on the Army Vote has now borne a certain amount of fruit, but we are not yet satisfied with the result, and, like Oliver Twist, we will keep on asking for more. If we examine the situation in this country to-day and realise the urgent necessity of affording relief to the taxpayer and of finding the money which is required for essential social services, we, on this side of the House—and I am sure that in this matter we express the views of the ordinary man in the street—are far from being satisfied with the amount which it is proposed to spend on the Army in the coming year. We consider that further reductions are essential, that they are a crying necessity under existing economic conditions, and that such further reductions would be effected by any Government worthy of the name, and by any Government which had, as this Government professes to have on convenient occasions, the welfare of the ordinary people at heart.

We think that under normal conditions a sum approximately of one million pounds per annum would be a reasonable amount to expend on Army services. If it should be considered advisable in future to render financial assistance to officers' training corps, gymnastic clubs, rifle clubs, and associations for training the youth of the country, and to expend a certain amount each year on the manufacture of munitions and supply services, we think that a million and a quarter might be considered as the maximum cost. Present conditions, however, are by no means normal, and I think until this country is placed on a secure financial footing, until her industries are firmly established, and until trade and commerce are in a sound position, it is imperative that the cost of our defence forces should be reduced to the absolute minimum [1163] consistent with effectiveness. This matter of the Army was debated at length last October, I think, on last year's Estimate, and Deputies from this side of the House again and again pointed out and emphasised the utter uselessness of the present type of Army organisation to cope with attack or to defend this country against an outside power. The Minister for Agriculture, in that debate, frankly admitted that the Army was useless for that purpose and, furthermore, he said that it was not intended to use it for that purpose. That makes the position quite clear. The people of this country are being asked to provide a huge sum of money annually to maintain and keep in existence an Army which is, as the Minister for Agriculture said, utterly useless for the main purpose of any defence force, namely, to defend the country against attack from any outside power. We are supposed to be getting away from the old system, and we are told that the Army is being reorganised. I think that the Minister for Defence stated, on the 1st April, the approximate number of N.C.O.'s and men was 6,500, and the number of officers 500, approximately 7,000, and including them you have two types of reserve. The Minister, in introducing the Estimate to-day, made no reference whatever to the bringing into existence of a territorial force. This matter is apparently still in the air, and to my mind we are as far as ever from a radical change in the system. The Minister stated, I think, in last year's debate that he had hoped to bring a territorial force into existence. I would like to ask him to state definitely in his reply what his intentions are in the matter, and when he expects to make a start on this branch.

The Government, I suggest, is only tinkering with this question of national defence. The system in existence at present, with its tendency towards large paid reserves, is simply an extension of the old system which has been in existence in this country during the past five or six years. That system, as I said [1164] before in a previous debate, follows too closely on British Army methods and British Army organisation to suit either the requirements or the financial resources of this country. I spoke before also of our objection to the principle of large paid reserves. We on this side of the House consider it objectionable and unwise to promote any such system to a great extent. Our objection is not so much a question of the actual pay involved, although that is a matter which is deserving of serious consideration from the point of view of economy, as the wrong idea which we consider is behind the entire system. We think that the formation of large paid reserves should not be encouraged. On the other hand, we consider that the formation of a territorial or citizens' defence force should receive primary consideration from the Government and the Minister for Defence in particular. When the question of a volunteer force is raised in this House we have, of course, the usual cheap sneers about unpaid heroes, and so on. I suppose it is hardly worth while to pay much attention to remarks of that nature, especially when one considers the quarters from which they emanate. I will merely say that the unpaid heroes of 1920 and 1921 had a record second to none. They certainly had nothing to be ashamed of so far as their general conduct was concerned.

I suppose, in a way, it is difficult, and perhaps unfair, to blame the present Government for their refusal to tackle this problem of national defence in the right manner. They are unable to do so. They are not in a position to tackle it in the right way. It can only be tackled successfully, and at a minimum cost to the taxpayers of the country, when a national Government is in control, when you have a Government in office in this country in whose military policy, in whose national defence policy, the citizens of the country will have every confidence. There must be all-round support and a united national outlook for a satisfactory solution of [1165] this important problem. The hands of the present Government are tied. Their declared loyalty to the British Empire, their complete satisfaction with our present status, their refusal on many occasions to stand up for their rights, their attitude all along is the attitude displayed in this matter of national defence. We know what to expect from them in this as in other matters of policy, and we are not going to be very optimistic about their intentions. If we are going to have a defence force in this country, and if the taxpayers of the country are going to provide a huge sum of money annually to be spent on the maintenance and the organisation of an Army, it should be an Army which can be relied upon to defend this country if it were invaded by an outside power and not be, simply as I consider it at present, a glorified police force.

The Minister for Agriculture, as I said before, told us that the Army was utterly useless for the ordinary purpose of an army. If the Army is being maintained solely as an auxiliary police force, what necessity is there for having a Ministry of Defence at all? Why not abolish the Army altogether, hand over these armed men to the Minister for Justice, and let him control them as an auxiliary police force? If we are to tackle this question of an effective national defence force, we must organise and train our army with the object of securing an effective guerilla fighting machine which can be relied upon to make it impossible for an enemy to remain in this country or to attempt to govern this country. That, I consider, is the only basis upon which we can hope to defend ourselves against attack from an outside power, and any money and energy expended in organising or perfecting any other system is just so much money and energy cast to the winds. The position of the Minister for Defence reminds me of the picture of the lunatic who was attempting to empty a barrel of water with a bottomless bucket. The Minister for Defence is making just as much impression on this problem as the [1166] lunatic made on the barrel. We must rely upon ourselves entirely in this matter of national defence. All the talk about the League of Nations, the peace pacts and the disarmament conferences is, to my mind, just so much humbug and hypocrisy. The only guarantee we, in this country, can have is the guarantee of possessing an effective and powerful defence force. Armed neutrality should be the policy of this country in the future. To avert the worst, it is necessary to prepare for the worst. Again, as has been pointed out before from these benches, if our national demands are to be met, if we are to make any advance towards complete independence, our arguments must necessarily be supported by physical force. When I say that I do not want it to be taken that I am, in any way, advocating war. Personally, I am not a militarist.

I have the utmost horror of war and all the sufferings and misery war entails but I do hold that the best possible insurance against war, the surest way to avoid bloodshed is to have an effective fighting machine. We know from the history of our country in the past that the only occasion upon which our national demands were met were those when such demands were effectively supported by physical force. We know the example of the Volunteers of 1782 and in our own time we have seen the result of the organised national opposition to the conscription menace during the years of the Great War. I certainly suggest to the Minister for Defence that the activities of his Department might be profitably directed towards this question of guerilla warfare. I suggest that the problem be closely studied in all its various aspects. Units, I suggest, should be organised so as to be as mobile and self-contained as possible and special attention should be given to the training and equipment of machine-gun sections. The question also of the provision and use of a light type of mountain howitzer is deserving of special consideration.

With regard to the actual cost of [1167] the Army and the question of maintaining an effective defence force in this country for the sum of £1,000,000 per annum, I went into this matter in detail last October on last year's Estimates and there is hardly any necessity to cover the same ground again. Assuming £60,000 is the figure advisable to aim at for territorial forces and taking outside figures for the cost, maintenance and all the various charges in connection with that force I showed that the maximum cost of such a system would be about £450,000. Such total cost of £450,000 would not be reached for a period of ten or twelve years and the initial cost during the first two or three years would not be more than about £200,000 or £300,000. These figures are a very generous estimate of the cost of such a system and I am sure the Minister for Defence will agree with me when I say that.

If we examine the figures in this year's estimate for the cost of A and B reserves it will be seen that it is intended to call up approximately 7,000 men for training at a cost of about £84,000, or about £12 per man. If I were to base my calculations on this figure of £12 per man, or the cost per head of the B reserve only, which is £10 per annum per man— and these figures, I may say, approach the average cost of similar systems in other countries—the initial and ultimate cost of the system I have suggested would be reduced by about a half. As I have said, however, I have taken outside figures to be on the safe side of my calculations and to cover all possible contingencies. As far as the size of a standing army is concerned, we suggested last year, and we see no reason to change the opinion, that 3,000 men would be ample for all requirements. The cost of such a force should not exceed £600,000. If we add to this the cost of the proposed territorial force, the total initial cost of the entire system would be about £800,000, and the maximum cost over a period of years would be £1,050,000. These points were put forward from these benches last year [1168] and I suggest to the House and the Minister that they are deserving of serious consideration. We have had enough of the Minister's usual airy and flippant manner of disposing of criticisms with a wave of his hand and answering points made in a debate of this nature with a string of high-sounding phrases and attempted witticisms. We would like a little common sense this time.

There are a few sub-heads in the estimate to which I would like to refer. Sub-head A—Pay of Officers, Cadets, N.C.O.'s and Men. I would like to refer to the pay of the officers in particular. The Minister for Defence stated before, and I think he stated to-day also, that he had reached the minimum number of officers. We take it, therefore, that 500 is considered the minimum number and that there will be no further reduction, as far as the Minister is concerned, in that number.

The total cost of these 500 officers, taking such figures as are available for pay, marriage and children allowances, lodging and subsistence allowances, and the various other allowances which officers receive, is approximately £275,000, roughly £530 per head per annum, or £10 per head per week. In addition, a number of these officers have a free house and free light, and they all, I understand, have free hospital and medical treatment. There is also a regulation—I think it is still in existence—that there is a provision of £450 for furnishing married officers' quarters. In any comments I am making on the Estimate or on the particular sub-head, I would not like it to be taken that I have any antagonism whatever to the Army, or particular members of the Army. I may have a different opinion from the Minister as to the positive nature of their services to the country, but I am not going to discuss that now. As far as the cost of these 500 officers is concerned, I consider it is rather excessive. I suggest that these officers are being over-generously treated as regards pay and the numerous allowances which they receive. I might exclude, to a certain extent, the junior officers from these remarks. I consider that [1169] the officers in the Army should not be placed in a much more favourable position than persons of equal ability and competence in other Governmental services or in outside occupations. I consider that there is room for further reduction both in the number of officers and in some of the many allowances which they receive. I suggest that the Minister should have these points considered.

The next sub-head upon which I would like to remark is sub-head A 1—Military educational courses abroad for specially selected officers. I may say that I thoroughly approve of the idea of sending selected officers abroad for special instruction. I am glad to see, for this purpose, America is preferred to England. I hope, however, that any future expenditure under this particular sub-head will not follow along the lines of the last course, when, I think, six officers spent six months in America. The total expenses, I understand, of that trip were £5,600—a little over £34 each per week. I consider that cost excessive. I suppose I may be pardoned for voicing the suspicion that the entire amount of £34 per week per officer was not spent on the acquisition of military knowledge. I am sure that a fair proportion of it was spent on social extravagances and on hitting the high spots, I suppose, at West Point, or whatever other academy the officers attended.

Sub-head A 2—Gratuities to retired and resigned officers. This year's Estimate provides for £64,000. Last year, I think, £44,000 was spent on this particular item, a total of about £110,000. I think this figure covered about 290 officers. This amounted, approximately, to £400 per officer. I suggest that £200 per officer, as an average, would be a more reasonable figure and that some of the money which would have been saved in this way could have been devoted to providing a small bounty or something in the nature of a bounty for N.C.O's and men whose services were dispensed with on account of the reorganisation of the Army. I think the distinction which has been made in [1170] this matter was, to say the least of it, unfair. These men were thrown on the labour market without any little reserve whatever to enable them to carry on over a month or two until they could get employment.

Then we come to the question of stores and transport. I suggest that there should be better supervision and a more accurate system of accounting in connection with lodging and subsistence allowances, with all transport charges and with the purchase of various types of stores. I consider that there is room for a general tightening up in these matters. As far as general stores are concerned, I would like to ask the Minister to give some explanation of why it should be necessary to sell, every year, large quantities of what are described in the Estimates as surplus and unserviceable stores. Last year £10,000 worth was sold and this year provision is made for the sale of £15,000 worth. I would like to ask the Minister if all these surplus stores have been in existence since 1922 and 1923 or are they the result of unnecessary purchases during the last few years? Would it not be possible to have better supervision in this matter of stores and to have a closer estimate of the requirements of the Army in this matter and, consequently, avoid the waste and loss involved in such transactions?

Next we come to war-like stores. I know that there is an appreciable increase in this item since last year. I suppose it would be incorrect to assume from this increase that the British Empire is contemplating war with any of her trade rivals. I notice also that there is a new purchase of rifles intended during the coming year. I would like to ask the Minister what is the position with regard to the 40,000 or 50,000 rifles which were left over since 1923. Are those rifles out of date? Are they being discarded, or does the Minister intend sending commercial travellers to Mexico or some such place to dispose of them?

Next we come to the Minister's own dug-out—the Department of [1171] Defence. I notice that the estimated cost of the Army has been reduced by approximately 20 per cent., but during the same period the estimated cost of the Department of Defence has been reduced by only 3.5 per cent. If we go back to the earliest available figures I have, those for 1926-27, we find that the total cost of the Army then was £2,309,700, and the cost of the Department of Defence, £51,354. Therefore, we see that while there has been a reduction in the cost of the Army of practically 38 per cent., over the same period the reduction in the cost of the Department of Defence has been only 3.5 per cent. I suggest to the Minister that such a state of affairs indicates a great need for the pruning knife, and that he should get to work in his own Department and reduce the cost considerably below its present figure.

The last item upon which I wish to touch is the Army reserves. I notice that provision is made for 230 officers on the reserve during the current year, and that the cost is approximately £90 per officer for the year. I should like to ask how many of these officers will be called up for training, or to assist in training, during the current year, and how many will receive grants averaging over £5 without coming up for training at all? Will the Minister also indicate how many of these particular officers are in receipt of service pensions, and how many of them received two years' pay and allowances on retiring from the army? As to the A and B reserves, I should like the Minister to state his intentions as far as the total strengths of these formations are concerned and when he expects such strengths to be reached. I support the motion for the referring back of the Estimate for reconsideration, and would ask all those Deputies who mean, or ever meant, what they said, when they spoke about economy and retrenchment, to go into the Division Lobby in favour of the motion.

Mr. Morrissey: I should like to [1172] support one point made by Deputy Kerlin, and that is in regard to the 4,000 odd men who have been dispensed with within a very short period. As Deputy Kerlin has stated, those men have been thrown on the labour market without any provision being made for them. It should be borne in mind that after from two to seven years' service in the Army these men were dispensed with and they are not even entitled to unemployment benefit; that they are thrown out absolutely destitute and are left to be dependent upon their people to support them—if they have any people. I agree that provision should be made for officers leaving the Army, but I suggest that the N.C.O.'s and men are also entitled to consideration, even if it were only to the extent of having their unemployment insurance cards stamped, so that they would be able to get unemployment benefit at least. I should like the Minister to take serious note of this point, particularly in view of the fact that at least another thousand men are to be discharged from the Army. It ought to be plain to the Minister and the House that there is very little likelihood of these men getting employment within a reasonable time, and they are therefore left in a very precarious position.

With the case generally made by Deputy Kerlin I do not feel competent to deal, nor do I desire to do so. Deputy Kerlin, however, made one point which I could not agree with, and which I hope is not true— that the only way in which peace, not only in this country, but all over the world, can be guaranteed is by each country having the most powerful and the largest fighting machine it can get together. I am sorry that is the view of Deputy Kerlin—it is not my view. If that view were held by this House and by similar institutions all over the world, I am afraid there would be very little hope for the future peace of the world. I am prepared to place more faith even in the disarmament conference than I am in having every man fit to march into the fighting arena. So far as this country is concerned, I [1173] hope that this House, and the people generally, will give more thought to peace and to the building up of the industries of the country than to fighting and to war. That is a point that I hope the House will not agree with Deputy Kerlin upon—that the only way we can secure peace in this country, and in the world generally, is to have huge fighting machines. I cannot believe that that is going to bring peace to this or to any other country.

Mr. G. Wolfe: The Government are to be congratulated upon having kept their word in bringing this Estimate down even below the figure mentioned last year. Anybody who was here five or six years ago could not but be struck with the magnitude of the work the Government have had in bringing the Estimate down to this figure. When I became a Deputy nearly six years ago the amount spent on the Army was very different from what it is now. In making that reduction, I think the country will consider that the Government have given great care and attention to the matter, so as to avoid, as far as they possibly could, any unnecessary hardship. They have brought the Estimate down now to a very reasonable figure. The Minister states that the officer strength has now reached the stage at which it is proposed not to lower it any further. I am glad to hear that, because if we are to have a small permanent nucleus, they must be efficient, and in order that they may be efficient, these officers must look forward to permanent employment which they are to spend their lives at, and also to some compensation at the completion of their service. I should like to know if any arrangement was likely to be made in that respect, because no one can be expected to give up his entire life to any profession without the hope of some provision after he passes what is likely to be his period of useful work.

I see that the Minister proposes that there should be a literary entrance examination into the Army, and that there should be further [1174] studies, but the Minister did not mention anything about the establishment of a military college for officers which I consider is a necessity. Every country has one. The country of whose constitution we are a replica in many respects has a military college at Kingston, where all their officers are efficiently trained. It is recognised in every country that a college for the training of young officers in the subjects which are necessary to their profession should be established. I should like to hear what the Minister has to say upon that subject. Deputy Kerlin, I think, called the Army a glorified police force——

Mr. Flinn: The Minister for Agriculture called it that——

Mr. Wolfe: And said that it would be practically useless to repel any attack that might be made on the country. Of course we are a small country, and could not fight any very powerful country permanently, but there is one thing we could do. If we were suddenly attacked we could keep the enemy at bay for a certain time, which would give us an opportunity for getting help from our allies, whoever they might be. That was the position in the case of Belgium in the late war. If Belgium had no army the enemy would have been very soon at Antwerp. The resistance she was able to put up gave time for assistance to be brought to her which was powerful and effective. I think the time has not yet arrived and that we have not reached that stage of perfection in which we could do without some armed force. In the days to come, when everything will be peaceful, when the lion will lie down with the lamb, and all that sort of thing, there will be no need for an army or a navy. But we have not yet arrived at that stage. I think that until we do, the course arrived at by the Minister in having a small and efficient nucleus is the proper course. By a nucleus I mean we must have a certain number of trained and efficient men who are experts in their trade and their particular line, always [1175] there, always ready to train men who may be called up suddenly. Of course, even as things are, war is possible. Even with the League of Nations established we have not yet done away with the possibility of war occurring by some untoward, very untoward circumstances, and we must be prepared for it.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle took the Chair.

Mr. Wolfe: I do not think there is any special item that calls for further remarks in the Estimate. I think reductions have been carried out fairly as far as that can be done. Of course, a number of men have to be discharged—that is the natural course of things—but I think, considering the numbers that have been demobilised in the last few years, it is very wonderful that there has not been more discontent and more unemployment than there is. I live in the centre of one of the biggest military districts in the country, and although, of course, a good many have come to me about different cases of hardship, and although I know there are many cases, still, all things considered, it might have been worse, and I do not think that it could have been prevented by any possibility. There has been a certain amount of hardship to some men and their families which is very regrettable. After all, if you have to reduce the Army it must naturally mean a certain amount of unemployment. You cannot have it both ways. The only thing that matters is to do it as slowly as it can be done and as carefully, and I think the Minister has done his very best to carry that out. I think that the progress made on the reduction of the Army is very satisfactory. I should like to ask the Minister if it is likely that a Bill will be passed this year for the regulation of the Army. Most Armies have an Act regulating matters in regard to discipline and other things connected with the Army. I think a Bill has been promised to us for some time, and now possibly the Minister will indicate when it is likely to be laid [1176] before the House. I think, on the whole, the Estimate is extremely satisfactory, and I have great pleasure in supporting it.

Mr. Lemass: I am intervening in this debate in order to make another attempt to get my mind clear as to what is or is not the defence policy of the Executive Council. The Minister for Defence will recollect that we debated this question at some length last year. The result of the debate was to leave us even more confused than we were before as to what particular policy the Executive Council is following in Army matters, or that it thinks it is following in Army matters. During the course of that debate we had the spectacle of two Ministers making statements relative to the purpose of the Army and its utility to serve that purpose directly contradictory to each other. At the conclusion of the debate we had a speech from the Minister for Defence—an impromptu speech made from manuscript—which was undoubtedly exceedingly witty, but I do not think he clarified in any way the difficulties that had arisen in the debate—the difficulty of apparent division in the Executive Council as to what the policy of the Army was or should be.

I am going to put before the Minister for Defence now certain propositions relative to this matter, with which I hope he will agree, but whether he agrees with them or not, I hope he will tell us what his attitude is. It is undoubtedly a matter of great personal satisfaction to him to be able to score debating points against his opponents, but it is an unsatisfactory way of enunciating the attitude he holds towards his Department and its work. He considered that his duty was done last year when he made a number of witty remarks about various Deputies on this side of the House, but I submit to him that it was not done. Because there was not merely in the minds of the Deputies here, but in the minds of people outside the House who have taken an interest in the matter, a very serious doubt as [1177] to whether the Executive Council has any policy at all in relation to national defence. Considering the matter of Army policy, we have got to take into account all the facts of our military situation. In the first place, we are an island. I think that would be generally agreed to by Deputies in all Parties.

Mr. O'Sullivan: Even by Deputy Corry.

Mr. Byrne: He says Ireland is an island surrounded by water.

Mr. Lemass: We are weak in man power. Our population is only 2,900,000, our man power is very low. We have got to take these facts into account, and taking these facts into account certain things are obvious, leaving for a moment out of consideration all questions of the possibility of war or strained relations between ourselves and Great Britain, and considering that the present political relationship between the two countries will continue.

The first obvious fact that faces us is this, that any nation that invades this country will be one strong enough to defeat the British navy on the seas, because it is quite obvious that while present relations continue at any rate Britain will not tolerate any other power establishing herself militarily here without resistance. I hope Deputies from all parts of the House will agree with that proposition. It indicates at any rate that such military opposition as we would have to face is likely to be very formidable. Any nation or power strong enough to beat the British on the seas and likely to invade this country in such strength is one that we could not hope to beat. The policy of the Executive Council according to the Minister for Defence, though not according to the Minister for Agriculture, is to maintain here an Army sufficiently strong and sufficiently effective to make an invader think twice before he decides to invade this country. Deputy Wolfe has just enunciated the same principle in other words—an Army sufficiently strong that if attacked we could keep the enemy at bay for [1178] some time until assistance came to us from our allies no matter where our allies might be.

The consequence of that policy must be fairly fully considered by the Dáil if it is going to express its satisfaction with it. We have, I think, to admit that if we are going to be invaded by an overwhelming force, by some power or combinations of powers, the strength of it will be such that we cannot hope for military victory. In fact there is no nation within striking distance of us with whom we could engage in war, with any hope of military victory. I think that is agreed. What would be the effect, therefore, of our offering resistance to the invaders who will come in the strength indicated? Merely to hold them at bay sufficiently long until assistance comes to us from some place. What will be the effect of keeping here an Army strong enough to make the invader think twice before he invades when the invasion has actually occurred? I think it is quite obvious that any damage that we could possibly inflict upon such an invader would be certainly not greater than the damage which the invader could inflict on us.

It is an old maxim of military science, first enunciated by Napoleon, that God fights with the big battalions and God would be with the big battalions against us. Also the war would be fought upon territory of this State and, consequently, the civilian population would suffer just as much as the Army would suffer. The Army would probably disappear altogether after a few battles. We would undoubtedly delay the enemy for a few days, perhaps for a few weeks. We would inflict a certain amount of damage upon him, but on the other hand, we would have so affected the fighting resources, the man power of this country, that any idea of continued resistance to that enemy's presence in the country would be out of the question for another generation. If we attempted to offer effective military resistance to any invader of the type that we are ever likely to encounter other than Britain, we [1179] would be only dissipating our strength by a futile demonstration.

When we take into consideration the type of Army which we would require and the type of Army which we should endeavour to maintain, we arrive at certain interesting conclusions. In the first place, we have no hope of military victory, and in the second place active military resistance of the type contemplated by the Executive Council would be worse than useless. It would be disastrous. We find that our conclusions lead us to the belief already enunciated in this country from Deputies on this side that the most effective form of resistance to aggression which we could possibly offer would be such as would be directed not towards expelling the invader but making it impossible for him to establish his position here in peace. Not merely do our arguments point to that conclusion, but the whole military history of our people points to the same conclusion.

If we are going to contemplate effective resistance to invasion or to attempted conquest it has got to be that type of resistance which is in accordance with our actual strategic position, and our available resources in men. It might be thought that this argument is an argument which is against maintaining an Army of any kind. It could be used for the purpose of spreading that idea if it were not for other considerations with which I will deal later. It is conceivably possible that a free Ireland might decide that its best policy was to have no military defence whatever. I am not arguing for or against physical resistance to attempted invasion or attempted conquest.

I believe that such physical resistance will come spontaneously if the right national spirit exists in the country irrespective of what kind of army exists in time of peace. I do not think that it is necessary that we should spend one and a half millions yearly in order to ensure that that resistance will take place. If the spirit of the people is right, if [1180] they want to resist aggression and to maintain their independence, resistance will come; and if the policy of the Executive Council recognises that fact they would be directing their energies not towards maintaining an elaborate military machine, but towards encouraging that spirit amongst the people and fostering it by encouraging voluntary physical drill, rifle clubs and volunteer associations, and those things that Deputy Kerlin mentioned.

There is, however, one other consideration that I must take into account, and that is our political relationship and our geographical proximity to England. Our proximity to England makes it essential that we should maintain an army of some kind. I think, however, there will be general agreement as to that in relation to the matter of political connection. It is desirable, and I am sure all parties in this House will consider it desirable, that in the event of England being engaged in a war we should be able to undertake, or claim to undertake our own defence, and thus obviate the possibility of England expressing a desire to utilise some section in the Treaty to send troops in here. We do not want to give the British people any pretext for sending their troops in here to occupy the country in a military manner. If we are able to show that there is an army sufficiently strong and sufficiently efficient to undertake the defences of the country, then we can raise a valid objection to any such proposal coming from our allies. It is, however, in relation to our geographical proximity that there may be some difference of opinion.

I maintain that it is in connection with England, and in connection with England only, that the policy of the Executive Council, as enunciated by the Minister for Defence, has any real validity. We should have an Army sufficiently strong and sufficiently well trained and equipped, as the Minister said, to make Britain think twice before she decides on any military demonstration against us. Britain is the only nation that is likely to indulge in any such military [1181] demonstration on anything except on minor points. Other nations will only attempt to intervene here if urgent military necessity compels them. Britain might conceivably think it worth while to intervene if this Dáil, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, which we are assured it possesses, passed some Act which Great Britain disliked. For example, if we amended the Constitution in any of its numerous Articles it is conceivably possible that some form of threat might be used against us which could not be effectively met unless there was in existence some sort of defence force with a promise of resistance behind it.

When we come to consider the type of army which our conditions require we should establish, we have to take several things into account. We must have an army so constituted, sufficiently strong, well-trained and equipped as to be able to justify our claim to Britain that we would be able, in the event of Britain going to war, to undertake our own defence and thus take from Britain any excuse she might allege for sending troops here. On the other hand, the Army must be capable of conducting that type of resistance which our own history teaches us will be the most effective against aggression. Again, it must be cheap to maintain, because any Army we can maintain under any circumstances must be well within the limits of the country's taxable capacity. We are at present spending something like 11/9 per head of the population to maintain a defence force. Perhaps I should have said we propose to spend that sum this year, because, in fact, we were spending a much larger sum heretofore. In my opinion that is too much. No one likes to take a figure of this kind arbitrarily and say: “We will spend so much and no more,” but in this matter I believe we can do so. Personally, I would say that one million is the most we are able to spend upon defence.

Deputies will recollect that the views of the Executive Council on this matter have changed. At one [1182] time the Minister for Finance was under the impression that two millions a year would represent normal Army expenditure, and the actual expenditure up to the limit of two millions was met out of normal revenue, the balance being raised by borrowing. When the cost came to two millions and there was still necessity for deceiving the people as to the actual position, just by altering his calculation as to the normal Army charge from two millions to one and a half millions he presented a balanced Budget to the people. I was expecting this year, if the Budget position had not been a little easier that we would find the views of the Minister changed and that part of the Army expenditure would be met by borrowing. He has not done so, and we propose to get the one and a half millions out of tax revenue. It is really too much, in view of the country's capacity to pay. No matter how urgent may be our need to maintain a defence force, or what particular dangers we may see for the nation in the years to come, one million is the most we can spend and we will have to get the best possible army for that sum. These considerations rule out of account the idea of maintaining a standing army. The Minister for Finance agrees with that conclusion, judging by his speech on the financial resolutions the other day; at least, that is the impression that he left on the mind of any one listening to him. They rule out also the type of army we have now—a standing army with a reserve. Obviously that is only another form of standing army. It contemplates operations on a standing army basis. If the Army goes to war the reserves will be called to the Colours and together they will constitute one unit modelled upon continental lines and utterly incapable of dealing even with a part of any force likely to come against us. It would muster to-day something like 14,000 reserves. It is not the size that I would object to so much as the constitution of such an army. It would be useless divided into units. The policy contemplated is [1183] that of an army acting as a brigade and nothing else. Once the machinery of the brigade was broken I believe the parts would fall to pieces and be utterly useless for defence.

Such an army as we require, not merely for the purpose of administration, but also for actual resistance, must fulfil certain conditions. It must be a volunteer force. If we are to contemplate real, effective resistance to attempted aggression it will depend very largely on the spirit that animates the fighters. If we are to depend on the spirit of the fighters we must get the right type, the volunteer type. It is useless to hope that anyone attracted into the Army as an avenue of escape from the prospect of unemployment will be prepared to offer the same sustained resistance during a period of considerable hardship as a volunteer, knowing what is expected of him, will do. It must, of course, be organised upon a territorial basis, local units, capable undoubtedly of acting together if necessary, but trained primarily for the purpose of acting separately. That would involve, I think, elected officers. Certainly the officers who would be in actual command of the men would have to secure from those men some sort of personal approval. It was, I think, on that system that the Boer Army was constituted during the Boer War, and in view of the similarity which existed between the type of warfare fought there and the type which we would probably have to wage in time of invasion, we would find that that system would be exceedingly suitable here. No army in which there is a very distinct division between the officer class and the other rank classes would be likely to maintain its discipline under such circumstances as we contemplate may arise here. The only army that could maintain discipline and cohesion would be an army in which there would be absolute confidence in the officers on the part of the men, and in that way [1184] some form of limited election would be desirable.

There is one consideration which is more important than all the others put together. If we are going to get such an army in this country it must be a defence force and a defence force only. We cannot ignore the political conditions that exist. We cannot ignore our recent past history. If the Army is to be constituted on those lines during this generation it must have no function whatever in relation to such matters as labour disputes or the maintenance of internal order. If it is to have any other function than that of defending the country against foreign aggression it cannot get that support of all sections of the community upon which it would depend for success. One could go further and say that there are conditions precedent to the establishment of such a force as does not now exist. Deputy Kerlin put his finger on one point when he said that before a volunteer army could be constituted, whether on the lines he indicated or on those which the Minister has in mind, you must have an Executive in which the people will have confidence. I do not mean that they should have confidence in their executive ability. It is to be presumed that the people had confidence in the executive ability of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party at the last election, but the people must have confidence that the Executive Council will resist aggression, and I do not think that they have been given any grounds for such confidence by the present Executive Council. There are, in fact, on record a number of speeches by various Ministers all implying that they would not in any circumstances contemplate physical resistance to outside aggression. I am leaving out of account the speech delivered on last year's Estimate by the Minister for Agriculture because I do not think that it would be fair to taunt the other Ministers with that speech, as it is generally recognised that the Minister for Agriculture is not to be taken as being [1185] altogether responsible for what he says.

Other Ministers, however, spoke, and, whether they said so in actual words or not, they left the impression on the minds of the people that the Army was maintained only for the purpose of maintaining internal order and that it was not contemplated at any time that it should be used against outside aggression except we were fighting a war as the allies of England and that England's enemies were going to fight us. If we are to assure the people that resistance to aggression, from any quarter whatever, will take place, the Executive Council must take steps to see that there will be a realisation amongst the people of the fact that it desires such resistance and a realisation of the form which that resistance will take. There must also be amongst the people a general desire to resist such aggression. I am afraid that, if the Government continues much longer in office, and its economic policy continues to work out as it is, there will, I am afraid, be a very small desire among the people to resist aggression, no matter whom it comes from, even from the Zulus or some race of that kind. However, taking for granted that there will exist when this problem comes up to be settled an Executive Council in whom the people, irrespective of Party, will have confidence as regards their national outlook, we believe that the problem of defence can be solved by establishing a force on the lines I have indicated, at a cost much less than what we are spending to maintain the present force, which is utterly useless as a defence force. It is undoubtedly of some value as an auxiliary to the Civic Guard. There may occasionally be internal disorders with which the Civic Guard cannot deal but with which the Army could deal. We do not want an army for that purpose, but if it existed for that purpose it should, as Deputy Kerlin suggested, be under the control of the Minister for Justice. There is no need for the Ministry of Defence, except to control the machinery of a force necessary [1186] for defence against external aggression.

Deputy Morrissey expressed regret that Deputy Kerlin should have thought that it was necessary to maintain a military force in order to preserve the peace. Undoubtedly if the nations of the world adopted the proposal of Soviet Russia and scrapped all the guns, cannons, tanks and battleships, there would be no need for an army.

Mr. Byrne: We have scrapped the battleships.

Mr. Lemass: Some of them, but the “Muirchu” is still left. My attention was drawn to a paragraph in the newspapers this morning relating to proposals before the Disarmament Committee at Geneva in relation to the use of poison gas in war. I thought that if there was one thing which the Free State Army would not use against its enemies it was poisoned gas. It is true that Ministers adopt that form of warfare in politics, but I am talking about an army engaged in resisting aggression. I find that their attitude in relation to poison gas is somewhat similar to our attitude in regard to armaments as a whole. Speaking through their representative, Lord Cushendun, a well-known Gael, they informed the conference that they would agree to the prohibition of the use in war of poisonous and asphyxiating gases with the reservation that it was conditional on all other Powers also ratifying. Whether other Powers will ratify we do not know. Presumably if they do not, the Free State is threatening the world that it will proceed to equip itself with the necessary poison-gas implements. I see by the Estimates that we are going to spend £25,300 more on warlike stores this year than last year. I do not know if the Executive Council have inside information that the Army is likely to be engaged in war this year. It is true that the Minister for Justice, through his Department, is doing his best to provoke a war. The Minister for Defence seems to be unduly optimistic. [1187] Of that £25,300 a sum of £10,000 is to be spent on munitions. The Army is going to expend this year more than twice the quantity of ammunition which it expended last year. I am not sure upon whom they expended that ammunition. Perhaps the Minister would tell us why they anticipate expending much more this year. Will he also tell us why this additional estimate for warlike stores is required? It includes £2,250 for anti-gas stores. It we are going to have anti-gas stores, perhaps we are entitled to ask why we are not to have gas stores, particularly in view of the threat which our representative held out yesterday to the nations of the world.

There is another minor matter about which I would like some information. I notice that we are giving £10 as assistance to civil aviation, to the Irish Aero Club. I would like to know, in the first place, if this is to be regarded as a token Vote or a grant-in-aid. If it is to be taken as a token Vote it means that we are going to be committed to a much greater expenditure than is set out here. If it is a grant-in-aid it is, of course, limited. Perhaps the Minister will tell us exactly what benefits the nation will derive from the activities of this Club. The exploits of the Club have been two up to the present. The first was on the occasion of the North City by-election. An aeroplane, the property of the Club, piloted by a gentleman whom we will call Colonel X, flew over the constituency dropping leaflets to the effect that “Colonel X is Ireland's greatest sportsman, and he supports Dr. O'Higgins in this election. This leaflet has been dropped from the sky by Colonel X.” If it is intended that people anxious to announce their qualities, by dropping leaflets from the skies, should have the use of an aeroplane for that purpose, and if it is intended that the Army is going to get any benefits from the existence of the Club, we want more information. Perhaps it is hoped that the Army will get assistance presumably from the fact that it is included in the [1188] Army Vote. If it was a grant-in-aid of a “booster's” club, as they say in America, it would be included in some other Vote, perhaps in the estimate for the President's Department.

The other exploit of the Club was in taking the President back from his constituents in Cork on yesterday. I suppose he had to fly back from them. Although it was undoubtedly very useful for the President to be taken back in an aeroplane, it conferred very little benefit on the country, I think. Certainly I object to any of the taxpayers' money being expended on the Irish Aero Club, unless it can be shown that some benefit is to be conferred on the people of the country. It did them no benefit when Deputy Doctor O'Higgins was elected for the North City—of course, that is my personal opinion—and it did them no benefit when the President was taken back from Cork. I would like to know what benefit it is expected the country will derive from the activities of this Club, and if it is intended that a larger sum than the amount named is to be paid to the Club. I would like, before sitting down, to ask the Minister, when replying, to speak spontaneously. I believe that we would get nearer to his own mind if he did.

Mr. J.J. Byrne: We have now the various criticisms of the Fianna Fáil Party on this Vote and I am sure that the country will greatly benefit from these criticisms. I wonder do the Fianna Fáil Deputies ask the House to take these criticisms seriously? We have had half a dozen different methods proposed here in the course of this debate, as an effective policy for which the Minister for Defence should be responsible. First of all we had the proposal that we should have an effective guerilla force that would make it impossible for an enemy to remain in the country. Next we had the proposal that we must rely upon ourselves, for, in this matter, the League of Nations is a mere humbug. Next we had the proposal of armed neutrality. What armed neutrality may mean, we were not told. On [1189] a previous occasion we had shall I say the exact antithesis to all these policies, the policy of what was called guaranteed neutrality for this country. Would it not be well, if, before coming into this House, the Fianna Fáil Deputies settled amongst themselves which of these many particular policies would be in the best interests of the country and come in presenting a united front, so that we and the country would know where they stood? Deputy Lemass told us that we had no army policy at all. Another fine contribution to the debate!

I think that as far as the policy of the party on these benches is concerned, I can do no better than to quote a few words used by the Minister for Finance in dealing with the criticisms of Deputy Lemass on the Budget. This will incidentally contradict the assertion made by Deputy Lemass that we on these benches have no intention of repelling aggression from an outside source. The policy laid down by the Minister for Finance is very pithy but it contains a good deal. He said that we must have an army here which would be a formidable army of defence in case the country was subjected to aggression. The Minister for Defence has outlined to you the plan by which he means to create that army should occasion arise. We have a highly efficient small standing army, highly trained and highly equipped. We have a number of men on reserve who can be instantly called to the colours, all of them trained men, so that as far as being in a position of impotence, should it ever happen that we should be attacked, is concerned I think that this country under the system which the Minister for Defence described to the House is in a really satisfactory position. Deputy Lemass went on further to say that we should take into account the fact that Ireland is an island and somebody said that even Deputy Corry would agree with that. He also said that we should take into account our man power, our present political relationship, and the fact that if the country were invaded the Army would probably disappear at [1190] once. These are the criticisms presented to a body like this, which should at least be entitled to believe that it is possessed of some intelligence. He told us, when my colleague on the right said that we should have some kind of force that would at least repel or delay aggression, that the mere fact of repelling or delaying aggression was of no material advantage. I wonder if the lessons of history have any value for Deputies opposite.

Mr. Corry: What history?

Mr. Byrne: I will give you an instance. In the Great War recently fought, a small expeditionary force was sent out to hold at bay a force nearly ten or twenty times numerically stronger than itself. What was the result of the delay? The result of the delay was the salvation of the kingdom of France. Those are lessons taught by history that I suggest should have some weight in a deliberative assembly of this kind.

Mr. Briscoe: May I ask if, according to history, the kingdom of France is not now the republic of France?

Mr. Byrne: I will take that correction. A slip of the tongue is no fault of the mind, and Irishmen are usually given that way. If you find nothing more serious than that in my remarks, I shall feel exceedingly pleased with myself when this debate is finished. Of course, we were also told that if England was engaged in war we ought to be able to undertake our own defence, and the defence suggested was that any army we had should run away. Speaking with some little pride in this nation, I may say that I never knew that Irishmen were a nation of cowards. Whatever we have done in the past, we have always been given credit for turning out some of the best fighting blood the world has produced.

I think if it comes to a case of the sort to which Deputy Lemass referred the Army we have will not run away, but will render an account of itself of which this little [1191] nation need not be ashamed. Deputy Lemass went on from one absurdity to another. The next thing he told us was that we should rely on a spontaneous spirit of nationalism by means of rifle clubs, etc. That should be the spirit that should animate the fighters, and then he told us, in another breath, that we should satisfy England that at least in the case of her being engaged in war we would have sufficient forces to defend this country from aggression without there being any need for her to land troops in this island. Was Deputy Lemass serious? Did he mean to ask England, that great nation, to rely on the spirit of nationalism by means of rifle clubs, and did he think for a moment that England would be satisfied that those were effective forces to defend this country? I never listened to such nonsense talked by a body of sensible men. It was purely ridiculous from beginning to end. Deputy Lemass told us in another breath that we will never be attacked by any nation except England. He asked us at the same time to take into consideration the political relationships existing in this country. I would like to take into consideration for just a moment the political relationships that exist at present. First, I would like to say that it is a matter to me of very sincere regret that this Vote upon the Army should be treated as a Party question. The salvation of this country should be considered by every man, whether he sits on these benches or those opposite. We have to-day at Geneva the question of armaments and of disarmament which is agitating the whole world. We come here and find one of those questions, highly important to every individual in the nation, treated in a spirit of levity and indifference by those men who sit on the opposite benches.

We are asked here to cut down this Vote to £1,000,000. The nation cannot afford to spend a million and a half, you have been told here from those benches. Another point [1192] clearly laying down the policy of the Government on this question is that, as far as the Army is concerned, we have now reached normal, and that it will be the effort of this country at least to keep it at its present strength. Why does this country want to go against the opinion of every other nation in the world? I referred a moment ago to the question of armaments and disarmament. We have France refusing to cut down the strength of her army, and we have Germany creating a secret army where she is debarred from having an army in the ordinary sense of the word by the terms of the treaty under which she laid down arms. The only country, we may say, that does not want these huge armaments is the great nation of America, to whom the forces of Europe are a matter of complete indifference. Every European nation at present is quarrelling and maintaining the upkeep of a certain army, and that army is regulated, as far as they are concerned, by the means at their disposal.

We are asked in this country to commit what may be termed political suicide, for that is what it really amounts to. We are to lose sight entirely of the strategic importance of this little country of ours. We have been told that it is not in the interests of any other nation except the great nation of England to come in here in an aggressive spirit. Was there ever such moonshine spoken as that? I would ask one for a moment just to realise that the whole international policy of Great Britain has, within the past few years, been completely revolutionised. We all know that at present we are a unit of the Commonwealth of Nations. What does that mean? It means that as a unit of the Commonwealth of Nations we are bound to receive, and not only that, but we will receive, the help of every other unit of which the Commonwealth is formed.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle: Surely the Deputy is travelling a long way from the Estimate now.

[1193] Mr. Flinn: He is very interesting; let him go on.

Mr. Byrne: I have been examining the various propositions put forward by members of the Opposition Benches. I have been asked to examine for a moment the political relationship between this country and other countries, and if I have done so I hope the time I have spent will not be altogether wasted. I am only endeavouring to bring this debate from the level of comedy to the seriousness and consideration it is entitled to. I suggest that in this country there is an absolute need for a permanent army. Whether that army be great or small, I think there are few men who have the interests of this country at heart who will not admit that we must have a permanent army of some shape or size. I very often hear the question asked by the man in the street as to why we need an army in this country at all. It is a common question, and I say it is a question that we here should give some consideration to. Anybody who asks that question is an individual who never thinks. We have seen recently, owing to the regrettable internal troubles that occurred in this country, what the absence of an army cost this little State. We have seen in the past that the absence of an army cost this little State something from twenty to thirty million pounds.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle: Not in the last year.

Mr. Byrne: Not in the last year, but I am speaking of the necessity of a standing army. I submit, with all respect, that I am closely within the terms of the Estimate.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle: The Deputy can only discuss what is within this Estimate.

Mr. Byrne: I submit I am closely within the terms of the Estimate in dealing with the subject I am dealing with, and with the arguments that were presented to us by the opposite side of the House.

Mr. Jordan: I respectfully submit [1194] that the Deputy is wrong in the estimate of twenty or twenty-five millions. I am surprised that the Minister for Agriculture did not enlighten him and say forty millions, the same as he did in Galway.

Minister for Agriculture (Mr. Hogan): On a point of explanation, twenty-five millions is my figure.

Mr. Byrne: If we take into account consequential damage, I think the Minister for Agriculture will not be very many millions out. However, I would like to say that we must have an army of some kind and of some strength in this country. Europe, at the present moment, is in a state of flux, and from it anything may emerge at any moment. I would ask Deputies of every Party in this House not to be led away by folly, because it is nothing else but folly that we have been listening to from Deputies on the opposite benches. I would especially ask Deputies on the Labour Benches not to be led away by the follies we have been listening to.

Mr. P. Hogan (Clare): On every side.

Mr. Byrne: I suggest Labour has an important interest in this question, as well as every other section of this community. I hope, when we go into the Division Lobby on this Vote, that we will have Labour following behind us to show that we are doing the best we can in the interests of the country and that they recognise that, and that they have not been led away by the futile arguments to which we have listened so long in this House to-day.

Mr. Colohan: Not being an expert on military strategy and tactics, or guerilla warfare, I do not intend to advise the Minister for Defence as to what plan or plans should be adopted in case of invasion of this country. Deputies on both sides of the House are giving advice as to how we should meet invasion. In fact, they are anticipating invasion, and they want the whole country to [1195] be prepared for another little war. We, on the Labour Benches, do not want war; we want peace, so that we may get a living in the country and not have to spend another thirty or forty million pounds. We know that the workers are paying through suffering and privation at the present time for the last war. I would rather take the line of Deputy Morrissey in his desire for peace and in his desire to help the national soldiers who are about to be discharged. I suggest to the Minister that some small bounty be paid to them on discharge, and if he cannot do that he ought to make some effort to have these men's contributions to the Unemployment Insurance Fund paid up, so that they can receive unemployment benefit. At the present time we are setting discharged soldiers against employed civilians. They are trying to get civilians ousted from their employment in order to secure their jobs. I say that should not be.

I am informed that in the Curragh Camp civilian workmen who are giving efficient service are being dispensed with gradually in order to make room for national soldiers who are discharged. That is not fair to the civilian workers. I do not see why a civilian workman at the Curragh Camp should be discharged in order to make room for a man who may come from any of the thirty-two counties of Ireland. It is not fair. I would like the Minister to make enquiries into that matter and see if this practice cannot be stopped. We feel it very much down there. We have not very much employment. Therefore it is all the more important for the few workers that are around there.

To come back to the question of what an efficient army should be, there is some talk about setting up a military training college. I presume that college will be established at the Curragh, and I would like the Minister for Defence to state whether any provision is made for the alteration and reconstruction of the buildings there, so as to convert them into a training college. That, [1196] I presume, would mean considerable expense and it would give much-needed employment at the Curragh Camp. If I am to take the tenor of the speeches this evening, it is work that would be reproductive, because the officers in training would have that knowledge which would enable them to carry on these wars ad infinitum, as so many Deputies want, if we are to judge by the speeches this evening. I would like the Minister for Defence to pay attention to these two points, the question of the discharging of civilian workers who are giving efficient service to make room for discharged soldiers, and also the setting up of a training college at the Curragh, so that our officers will be fully trained to meet any emergency in case there is an invasion of this country.

Sir James Craig: On some previous occasions I have been a very severe critic of the action of the Executive Council in connection with the expenditure in this Vote. I spoke with special knowledge on the matter I criticised, namely, the medical services. I find, however, that great improvements have been taking place and that great reductions have occurred since those days. I find that the number of officers has been reduced by nineteen and the number of nurses by seven, so that there is a total reduction of twenty-six. That was one of the points that I insisted upon from the beginning. I said that in a young army, without any serious outbreak of war or casualties, I could not see what the necessity was for keeping such a large army of medical men. I never, for a moment, suggested that medical men should not be paid satisfactory wages or salaries. I never for a moment suggested that they should curtail in any way either the equipment or the efficiency of the service given to our soldiers. We should give them the best. What I did maintain, and what I still maintain, is that there is no necessity whatsoever for two large hospitals, one at the Curragh and St. Bricin's, for the soldiers connected with a small army like ours at the present time. I showed, on the [1197] first occasion on which I offered criticism on this matter, that as far as St. Bricin's hospital was concerned, although there were 256 beds there, only an average of 109 beds were occupied during the year, and the cost per week per bed was 12/9, amounting to a total of £232 per annum, whereas at the Curragh the amount per week was only 9/6, or £173 per annum. I suggested that the number of cases that were in hospital were not even sufficient to fill St. Bricin's, and that it would be more satisfactory to have the hospital at the Curragh established upon a little better footing and to have it the only hospital used for the soldiers.

I am not satisfied that that change should not yet be made. I see no reason yet for altering the opinion I formed in that matter six years ago. In that way six or seven thousand pounds could be saved without any trouble. The training school is down at the Curragh, and if there was any emergency it would be quite easy to get cases that occurred in Dublin treated in one of the general hospitals. As a matter of fact, that has happened. The Minister for Defence has taken advantage of the staff of the Dublin hospitals. He sent certain fever cases, in one instance, to the Richmond Hospital, and maternity cases to the Coombe. There were even tubercular cases sent to the tuberculosis hospital. In connection with that it is a very amazing thing that the Minister for Defence was only willing to pay two guineas a week for the patient sent to the tuberculosis hospital, whereas he was willing to pay for cases in his own hospital twice or three times that amount. I want to reiterate that there is no necessity for maintaining these two large hospitals with something between 350 and 400 beds, as the total number of beds occupied in the year in which I asked for figures was, on the average, only 252, St. Bricin's itself having 256 beds. As I say, the reason I would like the hospital at the Curragh is because the men will be in the country air, because it is the training [1198] ground for young men, and it is run much cheaper than St. Bricin's. The cost in a general hospital in the City here is something like £140 per bed, per annum, whereas the cost at St. Bricin's, at the time I made the inquiry, was £232 per bed, and the average at the Curragh was £173. I merely reiterate these statements—I have not asked for any further particulars, because I am convinced that a saving of a good number of thousand pounds could be made there.

Dr. O'Higgins: In intervening in this debate, I can claim to do so with a certain amount of authority and a certain amount of representative responsibility, seeing that some Deputies claim that I was elected to this House by the 700 soldiers' votes, rather than by the other 27,000 odd. I rise to support this estimate for the Army. A motion has been made, on behalf of the Fianna Fáil Party, to refer the Estimate back. I presume that means either to reduce the sum drastically or disallow it altogether. In either case, it would mean throwing a considerable number out of employment into a market which is already overcrowded. In their desire to do that. I think that that particular Party are prompted and stimulated more by dislike for the Army than by love for the taxpayers. Their policy is, and always has been, to reduce the strength of the Army, whether by legitimate or illegitimate means. Doubtless, if they succeed sufficiently well in their objective, and make the Army so small as not to be effective——

Mr. Derrig: I should like to ask the Deputy what he means by saying that the Fianna Fáil Party always favoured the reduction of the Army by legitimate or illegitimate means. Will he tell us exactly what he means by illegitimate means in that connection?

Dr. O'Higgins: By action against the law of the State; that I understand is illegitimate.

Mr. Derrig: Would you show us——

[1199] An Leas-Cheann Comhairle: The Deputy ought to be allowed to make his speech.

Mr. Derrig: I do not want him to make a general statement against the Fianna Fáil Party without sustaining it. Will he now show where the Fianna Fáil Party took the action he says?

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle: The Deputy must be allowed to make his speech without interruption. Deputy Derrig can deal with it afterwards.

Dr. O'Higgins: If the Deputy wants to put me through a school of memory testing, I have not the time for that at present.

Mr. Derrig: I protest against your being allowed time to make accusations which you have not the courage or the capacity to sustain.

Mrs. Collins-O'Driscoll: Deputy Derrig does not know how to play the game.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle: “Order, order.”

Dr. O'Higgins: Doubtless, if that Party succeed in their objective of reducing the Army sufficiently, we will then be let into the secret of where exactly the legal centre of gravity in this country does lie. I hold that the only real national insurance which this country and its people have against either internal strife or disorder or external aggression is a reasonably strong and a thoroughly efficient Army. The Minister for Defence can be congratulated on having an Army which has increased in efficiency during a few short years to an extent which even an optimist would not anticipate or expect in twice that time. He can also be congratulated on having reduced to a very small figure the cost of the Army. I consider that more attention should be given to the efficiency of the Army than to economies inside the Army. The sum reached at present is undoubtedly a reasonable sum for the purpose for which it is intended, but all future policy should be directed more towards trying to make the most [1200] efficient machine possible from the numbers available. A small army with perfect efficiency can only be obtained by aiming at the highest degree of mobility.

In connection with that, I suggest to the Minister that during the coming year, or in future, more attention should be given to providing additional transport for the Army. At present some services in the Army, on account of the necessity for rigid economy, have not sufficient transport. The Army Medical Service, for example, is one. The individuals in that service are thoroughly efficient and highly trained, but the service as a whole is as immobile as the solid rock of the Republic which certain Deputies amuse themselves and others by scrambling up occasionally and then gracefully sliding down again. That service has not got sufficient transport to transport its own stores—that is leaving out the question of ambulances, which are only used for the transport of casualties. More consideration should be given by people in this House and outside to conditions in the Army, to the welfare of those in the Army, and of those leaving the Army. The time, I think, has arrived when the Army should be put upon a pensionable basis. It is unreasonable that the one State service that made it possible for all other State services to function, should be at present the only State service without a Pensions Act. There is a very reasonable explanation as to why a Pensions Act could not be brought into being earlier. The Army was changing; its organisation was not completed; its strength was not decided upon. Now, I take it that the Army is more or less fixed with regard to its strength, etc., and I hope that in the coming year that matter will receive attention. More attention should also be given to the question of the resettlement of those leaving the Army. Some Deputies have referred to the question of insurance with regard to N.C.O.'s and men leaving the Army. I think it would be more practical if, through employers, etc., some drive could be made to [1201] give a definite portion of vacancies to ex-Army men.

Deputy Kerlin, I think it was, without saying whether he was satisfied or dissatisfied with the reductions effected in the Army, who likened the Minister to a lunatic attempting to bail out a barrel of water with a bucket without a bottom. That lunatic would be nearly as sane a man as the Minister for Defence if he managed to bail out 360,000 pounds of water per annum—that is exactly what the Minister did in the last year with his bucket. It is not bad work from the point of view of finance.

Deputy Sir James Craig referred to the two big hospitals, one at the Curragh and one in Dublin. The fact that 109 beds are the average occupied in the Dublin hospital, which has a total capacity of 250 beds, means that at times that hospital must be taxed to its fullest capacity. In order to have an average throughout the year of 109, it means that at certain periods of the year the number of beds occupied would be twice, or two-and-a-half times that number. I can speak from personal experience when I say that last January, and for a period in February, the hospital was full to the very last bed, and, in fact, in addition to that, there were influenza cases that had to be treated in barrack wards. At the beginning of every year practically there is an epidemic of influenza. So long as there is an average of 109 occupied beds, the very minimum accommodation compatible with the work to be done to cater for all would be a hospital of twice that capacity. Up to the present there has been every reason why there should be a big hospital in Dublin and another in the Curragh. There may be some other arrangement with the demobilisation of troops in the future, but certainly up to the present there has been necessity for two hospitals.

Generally, with regard to this Estimate I think the House should hear a little bit more as to what the Army has done, and a little bit less of the annual attacks launched upon the Army, in the efforts to reduce the [1202] Army a little here and a little there. That kind of thing will never bring about any mental stability in the Army, and without mental stability people cannot settle down to do their job with thoroughness and efficiency. The Army has done very well in more fields than one. In sport, in aviation they have shown that they can hold their own very well with any other army in the world. That is a matter that should not be forgotten. New, if you like, inexperienced, if you like, unaccustomed to great publicity and public performances, they carried off the International jumping competition here last August, and on the Continent they did equally well. In every form of sport they have shown that they can hold their own with any other Army, and in military learning and training, wherever the officers have gone, they have been amongst the upper groups of officers at competitive examinations. That certainly is very creditable, and no good is done to the Army or to this House, or to the people of the country by always preaching the dismal tale, always pulling the poor mouth, always throwing a little bit of dirt at our own country—that we are always poor, paupers, broken down and cannot stand this and cannot put up anything. That is only going to breed a poor, weak spirit in the country. It would be better if the people who think for and of the country should call attention to the good things done for the country or in the country rather than to be led and stimulated by a policy or by a Party which appears to have made it their objective to try to outrival the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.

Mr. Carney: It did not surprise me in the slightest to hear Deputy O'Higgins make reference to the Fianna Fáil Party adopting illegitimate means. It was only what I would expect from Deputy O'Higgins. What qualifications he may possess to criticise the Fianna Fáil policy in Army matters I do not know. Undoubtedly in his own particular sphere as a professional man he might have but I have known [1203] him for some years and I must say that I do not know of any qualifications on which he bases his criticism of Army matters. He mentioned a matter that affects us particularly. He said that perhaps when we get into power people will be able to find out what is the legal centre of gravity. Our quarrel at the present time is that the legal centre of gravity is not in this House but in No. 10 Downing Street.

Now as regards pensions or a pensionable basis for a standing Army, I would point out to Deputies that that has already been suggested by the Fianna Fáil Party who have urged that there should be a small standing Army as a training force with a volunteer force behind it. We suggested a pensionable basis for the Army but we did not suggest pensions for those who served for a couple of years and came out of the Army scathless, without wounds of any sort or any disease or complaint and who got huge pensions which keep them walking about the country. We do not believe in that and we condemn it, but if any man has been wounded, has developed a disease or complaint in the Army, whether in the I.R.A. or whether in the service of the National Army we certainly would not stand in the way of a pension for that man. We object to people getting £300 down in pensions who have never been touched and who never suffered any wounds or any disease.

Deputy O'Higgins also spoke about our party launching annual attacks upon the Government in regard to the Army, but I would point out to the Deputy that I can use his own arguments against him for he says that the Minister has succeeded in reducing the expenditure on the Army and probably if we had not launched these annual attacks the Minister would not have reduced the expenditure on the Army at all. There is an item of £107,338 for Army reserve. We hold with a certain amount of truth that that Army reserve is only being created. The men are sent out of the Army. It was suggested there should be a certain [1204] amount of consideration given to them when they go out. Very good. That is all right but there are many unemployed to whom no consideration is given and who are supposed to be absolutely on the same basis as those in this Vote. But are they? Not at all. The sum of £107,338 is spent upon them in order to keep them loyal to the present administration and in order that they may be there during election times for the purpose of preventing anybody interrupting a Minister or a Cumann na nGaedheal deputy. We have seen it.

We suggest that there should be a small standing army and a volunteer reserve. My colleague, Deputy Kerlin, gave certain facts and figures the last time this debate was on. If we are going to be up against what we had to contend with before—aggression from possibly the only country that we need fear aggression from, or any other country for that matter—our best method of fighting, and anybody who knows anything about army matters will bear me out in this, is by the system known as guerilla warfare. We cannot hope to stand up against the gas attacks of England or any other country, or bombardments from the coast. Our best method is to train a volunteer force, an unpaid force. Undoubtedly it will cost something, but not as much as the volunteer reserve that is proposed. We had the men before when we wanted them, and if the country wants men again we can get them without having to keep them in a sort of humour by giving them a sum of £177,388 per annum.

Reference was made to army transport. I had a very short experience of the same army. I remember, when I was chief supplies officer, telling the Quartermaster-General that Napoleon once said: “An army marches on its stomach.” I said that if these people continue to get what they are getting, this army is going to crawl on its stomach. I must say, without any disparagement to the men there, that evidently the horses over at [1205] Nice must have been crawling on their stomachs. Nevertheless, we hear a lot here about our reputation on the Continent.

We would like a definite declaration from the Minister as to Army policy. There are a couple of sayings that we could quote relative to their policy. For instance, we were led to believe by the Minister for Finance that in the event of a war in which England would be engaged the Free State Army would also be engaged in that war. Is that true? An ostrich, in order to escape seeing or hearing certain things, is said to hide its head in the sand. I believe that is a fallacy as regards the ostrich, and I do not believe the bird does it. There have been certain signs and portents within the last few years which would lead us to believe that all is not well between Continental and other Powers, such as America. The Minister will probably tell me I am romancing. If I were to produce English papers and also American papers, they would give a certain amount of proof of what I say. The Minister might not know that. The American papers are rigidly excluded; at least those that give any sort of proof of these matters are excluded. Several papers of that sort were sent to me, but they never arrived. Of course other papers came. In the English papers not so long ago there were certain denunciations of the United States in connection with the rumrunning schooner “I'm Alone.” The most remarkable thing I know is that the “I'm Alone” was a rum-running common or garden schooner, but her crew embraced three of the principal countries of the alliance—England, France and Canada. Those countries would be intimately concerned with any quarrel against America. A rather remarkable thing was that the crew did not contain a Japanese. Probably if it did the whole thing would have been exploded, because the immigration laws in the United States will not permit Japanese to enter. Then there is a naval base being erected at Singapore——

[1206] An Ceann Comhairle: Oh, now! I thought that the Japanese was the end of it, but Singapore!

Mr. Carney: I am only proving that those things may happen.

An Ceann Comhairle: The expense of building a naval base at Singapore is not in this Vote.

Mr. Carney: All these things are happening and we want to know what position this country will occupy. If we cannot disclose these things here they will be talked about elsewhere, because the people in the country know very well of the matters I was going to talk about. If the Minister does not give a direct answer, if he tries to talk flippantly, we will know how to deal with him. We want to know, if this country is going to be mixed up in a quarrel between England and the United States, what part is the Army of the Free State going to play? Are they going to be neutral, or are they going to allow this country to be the jumping-off ground for either America or England? It does not matter a straw to me, but I would not like this country to be made a jumping-off ground for any other country. Are we going to allow Ireland to be made a shambles, and are we going to allow the people's money to be devoted to that purpose? The Minister must answer that. If he does not give a direct answer, if he remains silent, then he will plunge this country into a dirty quarrel possibly between America and England, or England and some other country.

Mr. Fitzgerald: Why not vote against it?

Mr. Carney: It does not matter about the voting, because we know we will be beaten anyhow. Are the members of the Dáil going to stand for that? There are numbers of people who think we are talking here merely for the sake of talking. That is not so. Many times here we would not talk at all if we set out to be merely obstructionists. But we put up certain constructive points which were utilised afterwards [1207] by the Cumann na nGaedheal Party. We put them forward, not from the point of view of mere political tactics, but because they were sincere. The very fact that the Minister has succeeded on two separate occasions in reducing his Vote, even by a very little, has proved that our policy was absolutely right from the beginning.

Mr. Anthony: I believe with other Deputies that the best national insurance that this country can have is in a fairly efficient Army and in a fairly efficient police force. One would think from the speeches of some Deputies that there was an anxiety on the part of the ordinary people of this country to go to war with somebody else. I meet many people in many parts of this country, and I have never met one who expressed a desire or a wish that we should go to war with any country. I would be very slow indeed to say or do anything that would interfere with the efficiency of either the Army or the police force. There are, of course, a few things to which I would like to direct the attention of this House and of the Minister. That is in connection with the material position of the soldier while serving and the material position of the soldier when he has finished service in the Army.

I would much prefer that instead of discussing a war of aggression or a war of defence that we would be discussing the best manner in which we could induce our people, the people of the Saorstát, to so conduct themselves that we would be able to reduce our Army and our police force. But so far as I can see, there are no indications whatsoever that we can reduce the police force by one man, or that we can reduce the Army by one man, so long as we have in this country a stable Government threatened, and so long as we have a second mythical Army or a second mythical Government proclaimed. So long as you have these things you will have the necessity for a well-trained, efficient Army, and the necessity for a well-trained [1208] and efficient police force. Deputy Lemass I think it was who asked the question why it was that the Minister was providing in this Vote for increased expenditure in the way of ammunition and war-like stores. I presume that the Minister does not anticipate coming on any more dumps this year than last year, and he does not expect much help in that direction. Possibly if he were helped in that direction, and if some of those dumps turned up, he might not expend so much money on war-like stores and munitions.

Reference has been made by Deputy Carney to what might occur to us in the event of a war between America and England, for instance. I am not a military expert, but my own belief is, and the belief is commonly shared, that if we had a great war in the morning we would be treated just as Belgium was in the big war. Anything in the nature of the Army that we would have would certainly put up a fight. That Army might delay matters for the enemy or the invader, but beyond that it would do very little indeed. We are not in a position to place a very large or efficient army in the field. We certainly could do something to delay any power who might attempt to land her forces in this country, but beyond delaying them we would be able to do nothing effective. In face of the fact that we are an island and can be bombarded by battleships from any part of the coast, I do not see what chance we would have of surviving this bombardment. It may be rather a hopeless position and perhaps a confession that should not be made, but the fact is that the talk here about wars of aggression and what we could do in a great war is a thing that I cannot join in, and, in fact, personally, I must say that it leaves me quite cold.

Coming down to the practical side of things in relation to the position of soldiers when they leave the National Army, I want to recall that on a previous occasion when discussing this Vote I suggested to the Minister that he should provide by way of deferred pay so as to ensure [1209] to the soldiers on leaving the Army that they would be self-supporting or that they would have sufficient to live upon for six or eight months. It is humiliating to think that a soldier who leaves the Army and goes on to the reserve with a paltry ninepence per day is expected to live on that. Not alone that, but the more serious part of it is this: that he becomes a competitor in the already overcrowded labour market. As a general rule he has no trade, craft or calling. He is generally drawn from the ranks of unskilled labour. I do not use that word in any belittling way. But he is in most cases drawn from that class, and when he is not drawn from that class he is drawn from a class that follows a blind alley occupation. In the drafting of men of that kind into the Army the Executive Government surely have some responsibility. It is, in my view, a crime to be putting men out of the Army without insuring at least that they would have something to live on or in the alternative that they would have some employment to take up. The system of deferred pay is in operation in other armies, and I do not see why it should not operate here.

There are a few other matters affecting the welfare of the soldier. These I think the Minister also should consider. There is the case of the unfortunate soldier who may happen to get married while in the service. His case is infinitely worse than the case of the single man when his time is expired and when he has to go into the reserve. We do find in military centres where young soldiers have got married that when they leave the Army and go into the reserve they become a burden on the rates. That is a state of affairs that should not continue.

A matter to which I would like to direct the attention of the Minister is the position of the relatives of a soldier who while in the Army has contracted a disease such as tuberculosis or some malignant complaint. I understand there is no provision made for the burial of an ex-soldier who contracts a disease while in the [1210] Army. You will have cases all over the Saorstát where these men have been buried in a pauper's grave. Some arrangement has to be made for that. I want particularly to emphasise that matter, and I hope